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After an industry emerge and is introduced on the market, a number of firms 
continue to enter the industry until the net entry of firms become saturated on 
the point so called "Shakeout". Shakeout describes phenomenon that net entry 
of firms on certain industry rapidly falls although market size continue to rise. 
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According to the industry life cycle theory, the industry face dramatic 
change during shakeout period. For instance, almost perfectly competitive 
market would becomes monopoly or oligopoly structure during this time. 
A number of economist studying empirical industrial organization have been 
trying to analyze survival mechanism on the period in which each firm face 
radical change in competitive environment. Their findings pointed out that the 
firm size, the time of market entrance and ex ante experience of firms before 
entering the new industry are significant variables to determine firm survival 
during shakeout process. These results do not contribute firm's strategic 
decision making because the factors they represented are only within 
environmental factors which individual firms never change. However, 
according to the theory regarding firm behavior in evolutionary economy, firm 
survival are influenced by environmental factors as well as active decision 
making which are called "selection" and "adaptation" in evolutionary economy 
context. Evolutionary economy regard firm active decision maker every 
moment. Therefore the aim of this research is to examine both deterministic 
and non-deterministic factors affecting firm survival during shakeout in one 
unified framework based on principle of evolutionary economy. In addition, 




To measure companies’ adaptation strategies objectively, this paper uses 
products level data distinctively. I analyzed data on 21,337 kinds of new 
automobile products in American automobile industry from 1905 to 1942 and 
5,508 kinds of new mobile phone products from 1994 to 2012. This paper 
includes four companies’ adaptation strategies such as technology level, 
technology growth, product dispersion and product difference using these data.  
Main results are followings. First, companies which has higher technology 
growth shows higher survival rate in pre-shakeout period. Since products does 
not meet the consumers needs in this period. Second, higher product difference 
shows higher survival rate. Although dominant design was emerged before 
shakeout period, imitating dominant design strategy can reduce companies’ 
survival rate. This is because companies which imitate dominant design can 
also surfer price competition pressure.  
The implications of this research are summarized as follows. First, the 
research demonstrates that the principle and framework suggested by 
evolutionary economists are effective and valuable in explaining firm survival 
mechanism. It implies further that the firms are not a passive actor in survival 
process but an active decision maker which enable firms to overcome huddles 
during shakeout. Second, the result shows that using product level data is 
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helpful to describe and understand firm behavior. Especially, it prove that firm 
heterogeneity can be explained by observing all products a firm makes. 
 
Keywords: Shakeout, Industry Lifecycle Theory, Product Analysis, 
Evolutionary Economics, Selection and Adaptation, Survival Analysis 
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1.1  Study background and purpose 
 
The economy is made up of various industries with different characteristics 
from one another. Some industries experience fast growth, while others decline. 
During such economic fluctuations, leading industries in the economy have 
been in a cycle of introduction and decline in the course of natural business 
cycles (Schumpeter, 1939). While all industries experience fluctuations, it was 
discovered that most industries experience similar cyclic patterns (Abernathy 
& Utterback, 1978; Gort & Klepper, 1982). This pattern was theorized as the 
industry life-cycle, and this theory has been developed based on evolutionary 
economics and Schumpeter's innovation theory (Gort & Klepper, 1982; 
Jovanovic & MacDonald, 1994; Utterback & Suarez, 1993).  
According to the industry life cycle theory, once an industry has been created, 
a number of firms will enter into that industry. However, despite the ongoing 
growth of the market, the number of entering firms will decrease rapidly after 
a certain point of time, which is called the “shakeout phenomenon” (Klepper & 
Miller, 1995). The shakeout phenomenon is now considered a general event 
that occurs in most industries (Filson, 2001; Gort & Klepper, 1982; Klepper & 
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Graddy, 1990), which can also be applied to newly created industries in the 
future.  
Around the time of a shakeout, an industrial structure change occurs, and in 
some extreme cases, a perfectly competitive market might be restructured into 
a monopoly market (Gort & Klepper, 1982). Therefore, it would be valuable to 
study a shakeout, since it can shed light on the causes of sudden changes in an 
industry’s structures. From the viewpoint of firms, it can also have important 
implications for the identification of survival strategies at this period, when a 
large number of firms exit from the industry. Moreover, a study on the shakeout 
phenomenon is worthwhile, because most firms that survive the shakeout 
period are likely to remain viable in the maturity stage for a long time, and 
maintain their dominant position in the market.  
Because of the importance of analysis on the shakeout, a large number of 
previous studies have attempted to identify the rules governing survival at the 
shakeout period (Agarwal & Audretsch, 2001; Klepper & Simons, 2000; S. 
Wagner & Cockburn, 2010). Most previous studies have dealt with a shakeout 
with respect to firm size, the time of entry of a firm into the market, and the 
analysis of the effects of experiences prior to entry into an industry on firm 
survival. However, most factors identified via previous studies did not provide 
any implications for firms, because those factors are difficult to control. That 
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is, firms were regarded as passive entities that had no option but to allow for 
the conditions of their chosen market’s environment.  
On the other hand, according to the selection and adaptation concept in 
evolutionary economics, firms are active entities that can adapt to market 
environments through the adaptation process. Therefore, this study aims to 
provide a strategic implication that firms can apply, and that is based on the 
perspective of evolutionary economics, by not only considering firms’ 
adaptation strategies, but also the selective mechanisms of the market. 
 
1.2  Research scope and method 
 
The most important task in the identification of adaptation strategies and 
selective mechanisms during a shakeout is to determine how to observe 
adaptation strategies. However, such determination is not an easy task, due to 
there being many hurdles to overcome. For example, a long history of data is 
required for this task, because the evolutionary process can continue for 
decades. In addition, since most firms get kicked out of the market during the 
evolutionary process of industries, these firm’s financial data may not be 
available, let alone their methods. Above all, it is a barrier to the identification 
of adaptation strategies that few methods are available that allow the 
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observation of adaptation strategies through objective data. A study by Gort and 
Klepper (1982) also mentioned such difficulties. They circumvented this 
difficulty to explain the phenomenon, although they failed to prove their theory 
empirically.   
To overcome such limitations, this paper aimed to identify the adaptation 
strategies of firms through information about their previous products in the 
market place. A firm maintains contact with its market through its products, and 
competes with other firms in the sense that a consumer’s purchase behavior is 
triggered by their products. It is also true that we should not attempt to identify 
adaptation strategies through only a single product of a firm, because a firm is 
unlikely to fail completely in an industry due to the failure of a single product. 
However, if we take all the products of a firm into account, it can give insights 
into some trends in their overall performance. Therefore, it is expected that the 
adaptation strategies taken by a firm in the past can be identified through all the 
products they release into the market to determine the effect of their adaptation 
strategies on their survival.  
For specificity, the performance data of products was indexed through the 
Hedonic price model, while adaptation strategies at a firm level such as 
technology levels, technology increase rates, product dispersion, and 
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differentiation were identified by employing various techniques used in product 
dynamics, engineering, and business administration.   
Furthermore, survival analysis was conducted at the same time in 
consideration of the adaptation strategies that were identified through product 
data, and selective factors such as firm size, entry timing of a firm into a market, 
and experiences prior to entry identified through previous studies. For survival 
analysis, Cox proportional hazards models such as time variables were used, 
and empirical analysis of different industries was conducted by utilizing data 
from the automobile industry in the early 20th century and from the mobile 
industry in the early 21st century. This study aimed to verify the adaptation 
strategies commonly taken in different environments, and how such adaptation 
strategies were implemented differently by industries at different stages in their 
respective industry life cycles. This will be examined through empirical 
analysis with regard to two industries, which were different in terms of their 
cycle stage and industry characteristics.   
This paper is related to a study on industry dynamics, which was conducted 
within a theoretical framework of the adaptation and selection of evolutionary 
economics, while the adaptation strategy was focused on technical 
characteristics. Therefore, business strategies such as mergers and acquisitions, 
marketing, or capital raising strategies were not discussed in this paper. Instead, 
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this study has focused on firm’s innovation strategies. Finally, note that since 
the shakeout phenomenon has been defined according to the industry life cycle 
theory, the chasm phenomenon, which is mainly discussed in business 
administration, is beyond the scope of this paper.  
 
1.3  Contribution of this study 
 
This paper is differentiated from previous studies in many ways; first, this 
study contributed to presenting and applying a study framework of selection 
and adaptation in evolutionary economics at the shakeout period for the first 
time. In addition, this study contributed to empirical analysis in consideration 
of the selection and adaptation concept in evolutionary economics with balance. 
Most previous studies did not consider adaptation strategies or only considered 
fragmented adaptation strategies such as innovation. However, this study 
overcame such limitations by considering innovation strategies from 
multifaceted dimensions. By considering adaptation strategies from 
multifaceted dimensions, firms that were viewed as passive entities can be 
recognized as active entities that survive through adaptation. Through such 
attempts, this study has contributed to the identification of adaptation strategies 
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that can have a positive effect on survival during the shakeout, and provide an 
implication that can be employed practically. 
From a methodological viewpoint, this study has contributed to providing a 
method that can identify objective adaptation strategies. That is, adaptation 
strategies at the firm level can be identified using product-level data, thereby 
enabling the consideration of the heterogeneity of firms.  
This study also contributes to the explanation of the evolutionary processes 
of industries through product analysis, which has already been done in business 
administration, engineering, and product dynamics. Therefore, this study has a 
significant contribution as an inter-disciplinary study that connects business 
administration, engineering, and economics. 
 
1.4  Paper organization 
 
This paper is organized into six chapters as follows: In Chapter 2, the 
concept of the selection and adaptation of evolutionary economics is explained 
as a background of this study, as is the industry life cycle theory. While 
discussing the industry life cycle theory, which changes in the evolutionary 
process of industries occur was also discussed. In addition, this chapter focuses 
on the shakeout phenomenon in the industry life cycle, thereby explaining the 
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efforts of the theoretical approach towards the definition and cause of 
occurrences of the shakeout phenomenon. In Chapter 3, the formalized facts of 
the selective mechanism are derived through previous studies related to firm 
survival at the time of shakeout, and the limitations and improvements of 
previous studies are explained. In Chapter 4, empirical analysis of the US 
automobile industry is conducted, while empirical analysis on the mobile 
industry is conducted in Chapter 5. Through these two empirical studies, the 
adaptation strategies and selective mechanisms of the industries are discovered. 
Finally, Chapter 6 presents the conclusion in which a summary, implications, 






 Theoretical background 
 
2.1  Evolutionary economics and industry life cycle 
theory 
 
The economy is composed of different industries working with one another. 
Some industries are growing rapidly, while other industries decline. During 
such economic fluctuations, the leading industries in an economy have been in 
a cycle of introduction and decline in the course of their Business Cycles 
(Schumpeter, 1939). Efforts to understand how industries are formed and 
change began over a century ago (Marshall & Marshall, 1879). 
However, studies conducted due to interest in the evolutionary process of 
industries did not start in earnest until the 1980s (Dosi, 1982; Gort & Klepper, 
1982). Previous studies were conducted based on the neoclassical model of 
economics, and did not focus on the process of industrial evolution in which 
the number of firms increased rapidly at the early stages of an industry’s 
evolution followed by its rapid decrease in the number of firms after a shakeout, 
but focused on the equilibrium after industry maturation. They also modelled 
the steady-state of the industry through the equilibrium model or optimization 
of social welfare (Baumol, 1982; Douglas & Miller, 1974). Therefore, previous 
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studies were only interested in the changes in the industry structures revealed 
through the phenomenon in the early stages of industry, but lacked the interest 
in industry dynamics, which is the process of changes. 
However, scholars affected by the advancement of evolutionary economics 
were interested in the evolution of the industry since 1980, thereby discovering 
a similar cyclic pattern in most industries (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; Gort 
& Klepper, 1982). This pattern is theorized, and is the result of the industry life 
cycle theory. Therefore, the industry life cycle theory was founded on 
evolutionary economics and Schumpeter's innovation theory (Gort & Klepper, 
1982; Jovanovic & MacDonald, 1994; Utterback & Suarez, 1993), and this 
study is also based on the same theories.  
A shakeout, which is the focus of this paper, is a phenomenon that occurs in 
the middle of the above industry development. To have an in-depth 
understanding of the shakeout phenomenon, it is necessary to understand the 
changes in industries from their generation to maturation industry first. 
Therefore, this paper is organized as follows:  
In Section 2.2, the selection and adaptation concepts of evolutionary 
economics are explained as a background to the theory of analysis to shed light 
on the survival mechanisms during a shakeout, which is the purpose of this 
study. In Section 2.3, the evolutionary process of industries is discussed, based 
10 
 
on the industry life cycle theory and changes in the industry from various 
dimensions. In Section 2.4, the definition, status, and causes of the shakeout 
phenomenon are described in detail. Finally, in Section 5, conclusions of the 
direction to analysis are presented based on the above background.  
 
2.2  Selection and adaptation mechanism of 
evolutionary economics 
 
In biology, organisms are selected by their natural environment and can 
adapt to the environment via genetic mutation. Since such natural environments 
continually change over time, the mechanism of natural selection also 
continually changes accordingly. However, even in such changing natural 
selection mechanisms, core characteristics do not change. One of these core 
characteristics is the principle of the survival of the fittest, which is the idea that 
species will adapt and change, and the best-suited mutations will become 
dominant (Williams, 2008). 
Such natural selection and adaptation is a mainstream, key theory in 
evolutionary biology, and the selection and adaptation concept in evolutionary 
economics that has been derived from it can be applied to the survival of firms 
(Baldwin & Rafiquzzaman, 1995; Meeus & Oerlemans, 2000). Note that in 
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evolutionary economics, selection is not done by natural selection, but by 
market mechanisms, while adaptation is done via the efforts of firms rather than 
through gene mutation, in contrast with evolutionary biology, which is the main 
difference from evolutionary biology. Adaptation in evolutionary biology is 
expressed through coincidental gene mutation, which means that organisms 
cannot modify themselves intentionally, whereas adaptation in evolutionary 
economics can be intentionally made by firms (Nelson & Winter, 1982).  
This has left a lot of possibility for firms to adapt themselves as they might 
wish. If they adapt well to changes in the market environment, they can survive 
within selection mechanisms in the market. Even if a given condition is 
disadvantageous for them, they can always find a way to survive through 
adaptation efforts. Therefore, two aspects shall be considered simultaneously 
to understand firms’ survival. The first is the selection mechanism in the market, 
and the second is the adaptation strategy of firms that satisfies the selection 
mechanisms.  
These two factors do not work separately, so should be considered 
simultaneously. As explained in evolutionary biology, as an environment 
changes over time, the mechanisms of selection and adaptation can also change, 
so dynamic characteristics shall be considered.  
12 
 
Therefore, the next section will discuss how the market environment can 
change according to the evolutionary process of industry as a background for 
the selection mechanism.   
 
2.3  Evolution of industry and the industry life cycle 
theory 
 
The industry life cycle theory is a representative theory that explains the 
evolutionary processes of industry, which theorizes that the development of 
industry has a cyclic pattern (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; Gort & Klepper, 
1982). Such a cyclic pattern is quite dynamic, in that it showed more difference 
within the same industry over time than the differences revealed between 
industries (Geroski, 1995). Furthermore, such a phenomenon does not only 
occur in a specific industry, but is common to most industries (Filson, 2001; 
Gort & Klepper, 1982; Klepper & Graddy, 1990). This dynamic change can be 
seen in many aspects of industries, such as innovation, production volume, firm 
sizes, regimes, and entry and exit rates.    
The next sections will discuss changes according to the evolutionary 




 Changes in terms of innovation 
It can be observed that there are changes in the general terms of innovation 
when a new industry is introduced and allowed to mature. In general, the 
introduction of an industry is triggered by radical innovation, followed by 
gradual innovation thereafter. The radical and gradual innovations alternate as 
that industry’s evolution continues (Abernathy, 1978; Gort & Klepper, 1982; 
Utterback & Abernathy, 1975) and the changes in industries are theorized as a 
cross between radical and gradual innovations (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; 
Henderson & Clark, 1990; Tushman & Anderson, 1986).   
In addition, changes in terms of product and process innovations occur. In 
the early stages of an industry, product innovation occurs first, due to consumer 
requests or the advancement of science and technology (Malerba & Orsenigo, 
1996). Then, the focus of innovation moves to the process of innovation as the 
industry matures (Gort & Klepper, 1982).  
In the industry life cycle theory, the emergence of industry is recognized by 
the introduction of products that present technological opportunities. To have 
such technological opportunities, a number of firms attempt to enter by 
implementing a variety of product innovations. These technology opportunities 
arise discontinuously. Although technological discontinuity is an outcome of 
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experience, it can also occur through a purpose-oriented innovation process 
(Nelson & Winter, 1977). 
Since products at their early stages are generally primitive, consumers are 
less willing to buy them. However, competition increases as more new 
companies enter into the industry over time. As a result, the quality of products 
continually increases, while prices decrease less rapidly. This will result in the 
increase of products’ values, followed by increases in sales (Agarwal & Bayus, 
2002). 
At the early stages of an industry, a single product cannot dominate 
(Utterback & Abernathy, 1975). At this stage, firms observe customer reactions 
to their products with short production processes, and introduce their products 
into the market by improving upon them. In the early stages of a new industry’s 
introduction, products that retain early designs are manufactured using 
relatively non-specialized machinery, and sold through various experimental 
techniques (Williamson, 1975). Therefore, a newly introduced industry is 
characterized by a high innovation rate for new products in terms of R&D 
expenses, relative to their attempting experimental techniques (Audretsch, 
1995b). It is also found that there is a higher application rate for patents in the 
early stages of industry than in its mature stages (Agarwal, 1998). In addition, 
companies compete with one another to produce dominant design products 
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through various experimental techniques in the early stages of industry. 
Although their success rate is low, a few successful companies may enjoy high 
growth rates.   
In contrast, the opportunity to set the standardization of products through 
innovation activities becomes more difficult at the mature stage. Although 
radical innovations are less dominant in this stage, companies newly entering 
into an industry may do so to claim a strategic niche. According to the theory 
of strategic niches, a firm retains a small portion of the business, but takes a 
niche that cannot be accessed by larger firms to generate similar levels of profit 
as larger firms (Caves & Porter, 1977; Newman, 1978; Porter, 1979). In the 
mature stage of the cycle, disadvantages due to the smaller scale experienced 
by small companies can be avoided through the above strategy that targets 
strategic niches. Therefore, the size of a company may confer the advantage of 
reducing the possibility of failure in the early stages of an industry’s 
introduction, whereas this benefit is reduced at the mature stage (Newman, 
1978). 
Furthermore, product design at the mature stages of an industry is 
standardized and uniform, and products with superior technology at this stage 
have a premium advantage. Management and production technology at this 
stage reaches to a level where no room for improvements can be found 
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(Williamson, 1975). Therefore, the market at this stage may continue to grow, 
but the prediction of growth can be done due to some regularity found at this 
stage. The likelihood of major innovations is reduced, and improvements and 
refinements become the main activities at this stage. For example, the mature 
automobile industry has shown a relative decreasing trend of new product 
innovation, based on their R&D expenses (Audretsch, 1995a). Furthermore, 
patent acquisitions are gradually reduced at the mature stage (Agarwal, 1998). 
 
 Changes in terms of production volume and firm size 
Production volume is generally small in the early stages of industry, as 
business environments at this stage have high uncertainty. Therefore, 
companies are mainly competing to have the dominant products in the industry 
during the early stages of industry introduction. Contrastively, products are 
standardized and made uniform with the aid of mass production during the 
mature stage of an industry. Companies increase their production volumes to 
achieve economies of scale in production (Klepper & Graddy, 1990). In 
addition, a continuous relationship between customers and suppliers tends to 
require the minimization of changes so that market share does not change 
rapidly (Williamson, 1975).  
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There are also differences between industries at their early and mature stages, 
in terms of the distribution of company sizes within an industry. At the early 
stages of industry, most companies in said industry are small, and their 
production methods are inefficient (Malerba & Orsenigo, 1996). On the other 
hand, at the mature stage of industry, companies are larger, creating economies 
of scale and showing a high level of industry concentration (Utterback & Suarez, 
1993).  
 
 Changes in terms of regime 
There are also many changes in industry regimes between the early and 
mature stages of an industry. Here, the regimes proposed by many scholars have 
been summarized, and changes in industry environments are identified through 
regimes. 
Tushman and Anderson (1986) categorized discontinuity. According to 
them, discontinuities can be categorized as one that destroys existing 
capabilities, and one that improves upon existing capabilities. The destruction 
of existing capabilities is primarily done by newcomers, while the improvement 
of existing capabilities is primarily done by existing companies. Existing 
companies add new knowledge into their existing knowledge, create entry 
barriers, and increase the minimum requirements for entry.   
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A new industry is created by innovations that destroy existing capabilities, 
and the industry dynamics at this stage are called an entrepreneurial regime 
(Audretsch, 1991). At this stage, information plays a critical role. Nelson and 
Winter (1982) described two different technological regimes with fundamental 
differences in their knowledge conditions. An entrepreneurial regime is not 
favorable for the innovation activities of existing firms, but is favorable for 
innovative newcomers. Therefore, this stage is advantageous for innovative 
new firms (Winter, 1984). 
In addition, an entrepreneurial regime can show similar characteristics to 
that of competitive regimes, as proposed by Schumpeter (1939). This stage is 
generally confusing, and can be described as a time to pioneer a new path. Such 
innovation tends to be produced by newcomers. The technological regimes are 
well matched with the early stages of the industry life cycle. As a result, entries 
at the early stages tend to be based on more innovation-oriented activities 
compared to at the mature stage. Entries at the early stages of industry 
introduction are quite often employed as a transport means to introduce 
innovations (Geroski, 1995).  
On the other hand, as industries mature, there is a change in their regimes. 
A regime at the mature stage of an industry is called a routinized regime, which 
is the opposite concept of the regime explained above. Innovations that improve 
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upon existing capabilities are mainly driven at this stage. This stage is more 
advantageous to existing firms that hold more knowledge and experience of the 
industry than newcomers (Gort & Klepper, 1982).  
Audretsch (1995b) described and modeled the aspect of entry and exit due 
to regime changes figuratively as the revolving door and the replacing forest. 
According to the revolving door industry model, firms that are successful at 
continuous innovation survive, whereas firms that are temporarily successful at 
innovation enter, but then tend to exit quickly. Newcomer firms in the replacing 
forest industry try to replace existing firms; therefore, although innovation in 
this model only occurs once, the ramifications are significantly large.  
The revolving-door model models industries that have achieved economies 
of scale under a routinized regime, while the replacing forest model models 
newly introduced industries under an entrepreneurial regime. 
 
 Changes in terms of entry and exit 
The entry and exit of industries is important to study, because it 
demonstrates the industry’s structural characteristics. As product sales volumes 
increase, the cost of entry to the industry increases. This generally peaks at the 
early stages of an industry’s evolution (Gort & Klepper, 1982). This stage also 
experiences both quality improvements and the price reduction of products.  
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Many scholars have categorized the industry life cycle based on 
characteristics such as entry and exit, or the number of total firms in the industry. 
The upper side of Figure 1 shows the five evolutionary stages of a new product 
industry that was proposed by Gort and Klepper (1982), displaying the 
relationship between the number of firms and time. The lower side of Figure 1 
shows categorization by three stages. The five-stage categorization of the 
industry life cycle has been referenced widely (Agarwal & Gort, 1996; Gort & 
Klepper, 1982). However, recent studies have also used a three-phase division 
of prior to, during, and after the shakeout period (Dinlersoz & MacDonald, 
2009; Utterback & Suarez, 1993). The advantage of a three-phase division is 
that the second stage, which starts the reference time earlier than when the 
number of firms reaches a peak, provides more clarification than the five-stage 
classification; the last stage of the three-phase division is equivalent to the last 
stage of the five-stage classification. This paper follows the three-phase 
division, because it is more focused on the shakeout period. However, it is not 
significantly different to the five-stage division.  
The changes in entry and exit, and the number of total firms in each stage 
on the basis of the five-stage division are as follows: In the first stage, only a 
small number of firms have entered the industry, so few firms exist within that 
industry. In the second stage, the number of firms entering increases rapidly; 
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however, the increase in rate gradually decreases as it reaches the third stage, 
where the number of entries and exits become similar to one another, and the 
number of firms is relatively stabilized, albeit temporarily. In the fourth stage, 
the number of firms decreases rapidly despite the continuous growth of the 
industry due to the shakeout period. In the fifth stage, the number of firms 
stabilizes again, as neither entries nor exits occur. This stabilization continues 
for a considerable period of time. The classification of the evolutionary stages 
can be explained on the basis of the classification of basic changes such as 
technological innovation and the level of competition that occur at an industry 
level. 
Table 1 shows the characteristics of industries according to their five-stage 
division, by summarizing the industry changes from various perspectives 
described above, including the characteristics of entries and exits that occur at 
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Table. 1. The characteristics of each five stage according to the industry life cycle theory 
 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 Stage 5 
Entry Very few Increase Normal Very few Very few 
Exit Few Few Normal Increase Very few 
Number of Firms Very few Increase Max Decrease Stable 
Industry Concentration Very low Low Low Sudden increase Very high 
Firm Size Mid-small Mid-small Larger Large Large 
Entry Barrier Low Low Normal Increase High 
Focus of Competition Performance Dominant Design Performance to Price  Price Price 
Output Low Sudden increase Increase Increase Slow increase 
Product Price High Sudden decrease Decrease Decrease Slow decrease 
Amount of Innovation Normal Max Normal Max patents Decrease 
Innovation Type Product innovation Product innovation Product to process Process innovation Process innovation 




Table 2. The characteristics of each three stage according to the industry life cycle theory 
 Pre-Shakeout Period Shakeout Period Post-Shakeout Period 
Entry Max Few Few 
Exit Few Max Few 
Number of Firms Increase Sudden decrease Stable 
Industry Concentration Low Sudden increase Very high 
Firm Size Mid-small Mid-small to Large Large 
Entry Barrier Low Increase High 
Focus of Competition Performance Performance to price Price 
Output Increase Increase Slow increase 
Product Price Decrease Decrease Slow decrease 
Amount of Innovation Normal Max patents Decrease 
Innovation Type Product innovation Product to Process Process innovation 
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2.4  Definition of the shakeout phenomenon and 
cause of occurrence 
 
As discussed earlier, the number of firms increase as sales volume increases 
after a new industry emerges. However, at some point, a shakeout comes into 
effect, decreasing the number of firms, even as the market continues to grow. 
Around this time, most industrial characteristics such as the regimes of industry, 
innovation type, entries and exits, and industry concentration change. Therefore, 
a study is required to focus on the shakeout phenomenon that is centered on this 
change. In particular, with regard to industry structure, a perfectly competitive 
market can change into a monopoly market in some extreme cases (Gort & 
Klepper, 1982). Therefore, the causes of these changes in the industry structure 
can be determined if we have an in-depth understanding of the shakeout.  
Furthermore, a shakeout is a critical period of life and death for corporations, 
since it is a time when the number of firms decreases rapidly. It is also noted 
that the firms that survive the shakeout may enjoy a stable, monopolistic 
position for a considerable time in that industry.  
In terms of the requirements of innovation, the number of firms is also 
important socially. With respect to patents, which are one of the main 
parameters in the evolutionary perspective of the market, Agarwal (1997) 
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reported that as the later stages in an industry’s life cycle are approached, the 
patent-related activities of firms are reduced. He also reported that 
technologically innovative activities in most product markets are reduced as the 
number of firms in the industry decreases. Diversity tends to be recognized as 
a prerequisite condition in the creation of many innovations. Since a number of 
firms represent such diversity, sudden changes in the number of firms may be 
sufficient to draw our attention to the shakeout phenomenon. It has also been 
reported that the shakeout phenomenon occurs in most industries (Filson, 2001; 
Gort & Klepper, 1982; Klepper & Graddy, 1990). Therefore, stakeouts are 
expected to occur in many industries created in the future, so the in-depth 
understanding of stakeouts based on study achievements will be necessary in 
the future.  
Accordingly, this section reviews the definition and current status of the 
shakeout phenomenon for our in-depth understanding of this phenomenon, and 
summarizes formal models to identify the causes of the shakeout.  
 
 Definition of the shakeout phenomenon 
The shakeout phenomenon refers to the rapid reduction in the number of 
firms despite the increasing market size in an industry after a large number of 
entries have been made (Klepper & Miller, 1995). Although many different 
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theories can be made with regard to the shakeout phenomenon, most 
researchers agree that the reduction in product dispersion and innovation-
oriented changes from production innovation to process innovation could 
increase production volumes, but sales volume cannot increase indefinitely. 
Therefore, market share is restructured based on the firms that have larger 
capabilities, while other firms are kicked out of the market. Such massive 
destruction is called a shakeout (Klepper & Simons, 2005).  
A shakeout is not a phenomenon that only occurs in specific industries, but 
a general type in the evolution of new industries, which has been observed in 
most industries (Filson, 2001; Gort & Klepper, 1982; Klepper & Graddy, 1990). 
Shakeouts are generally known to occur in an early stage of new industries 
according to the industry life cycle theory, but they can also occur in mature 
industries (Bergek, Tell, Berggren, & Watson, 2008).  
However, not all industries experience a shakeout. Some researchers are of 
the opinion that a shakeout does not occur in an industry if continuous spin-off 
occurs or if generalists and specialists are able to coexist (Bonaccorsi & Giuri, 
2000; Buenstorf, 2007). It is also reported that a shakeout does not occur if new 
niches and submarkets are created continuously (Klepper & Thompson, 2006; 
Swaminathan, 1998).  
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In contrast, technological changes induce a shakeout, so a shakeout may be 
generated in mature industries due to technological changes (Bergek et al., 
2008). Contemporary industries tend to face shakeouts earlier than traditional 
industries (Agarwal & Gort, 2001; Day, Fein, & Ruppersberger, 2003). 
 
 Cause of occurrence of the shakeout phenomenon 
A number of researchers have suggested the causes of the shakeout 
phenomenon through modeling to understand why the number of firms 
decreases rapidly despite market growth in the corresponding industry. In this 
section, the core theories that can explain the cause of the occurrence of the 
shakeout phenomenon are presented and summarized comprehensively.  
The Dominant Design Theory proposed by Utterback and Suarez (1993) is 
the most widely known theory; it aimed to explain the shakeout phenomenon 
through the introduction of dominant design. Figure 2 shows the schematic 
diagram of this model.  
The concept of dominant strategy, introduced by Utterback and Abernathy 
(1975), considers that de facto standard is determined by major technological 
competence. Dominant design are followed by allegiance of consumers and a 
number of competence as well. In the wake of emergence of dominant design, 
source of competitiveness laid in price rather than level of technology or design 
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(Utterback and Suarez, 1993). Therefore, what we have to take care is that 
dominant design does not always means the best technological combination. For 
one instance, QWERTY-typed computer keyboard has been in position of dominant 
design for many decades despite its inferiority in view of technological competence 
(Diamond, 1997). Since it is difficult to practically observe and specify dominant 
design in every industry, some studies have been criticizing application of concept 
of dominant design in empirical researcher (Murmann & Frenken, 2006). 
Companies that did not complete product standardization and process 
innovation cannot compete effectively against companies that have completed 
them. Since consumers demand standardized designs, firms race to produce 
standardized products at a low price. If a new product design dominates the 
market, other entries to the market are reduced, thereby creating the shakeout 
phenomenon.  
In succession of the theories of this study, Cabral (2012) embodied the 
Dominant Design Theory using the concept of uncertainty and sunk cost. 
According to his study, firms that do not follow the path of dominant design 
have difficulties due to their sunk costs caused by development in different 
directions, even if firms are then able to follow the dominant design path later. 
Therefore, firms invest with small capabilities at the early stages of industry 
evolution. Since firms can enter into an industry with small capabilities at the 
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low entry barrier stages, a large number of newcomers are able to enter. 
However, if a dominant design emerges once entries are stabilized to some 
extent, firms that survived with firm technology development directions for the 
future are then able to invest actively in a long-term optimized scale, and firms 
are able to increase their size at the same time. However, if the market cannot 





Source : Utterback and Suarez (1993)  





However, considerable criticisms can also be made of Dominant Design 
Theory. For example, the emergence of a dominant design may be a special 
case, and it is a just one example among many possible cases in a market 
(Windrum & Birchenhall, 1998). Products such as helicopters that are sold in a 
narrow market may reduce diversification, whereas products such as airplanes 
that can be sold in a wide range of markets may have various niche markets, 
thereby creating various dominant designs.  
In addition, an empirical study that compared the introduction time of 
dominant designs and the influence of competition from newcomers in the early 
stages suggests that a shakeout was more affected by the influence of 
competition with newcomers in the early stages rather than the influence of the 
dominant design (Klepper & Simons, 2005). However, except for some studies 
that do not agree with the dominant design theory, most studies acknowledge 
that the cause of the shakeout phenomenon can be explained via the concept of 
dominant design theory.  
A model proposed by Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994) modeled the 
evolution of an industry using the difference of concepts between invention and 
innovation, and explained shakeouts through the model. Invention evolves from 
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other industries, while firms enter into industries to follow technological 
opportunities that can garner innovation from inventions.  
Firms that are successful in technology application and are able to scale 
themselves to the optimum size by reducing unit costs will survive, while other 
firms will be kicked out. 
 Accordingly, firms that perform such innovations earlier will have 
advantages over firms that are successful in innovation later, thereby kicking 
them out. Therefore, this model derives a result that supports First Mover 
Advantage.   
Klepper (2002b) presented that the shakeout phenomenon was not caused 
by events such as the advent of specific technologies or dominant design, but 
by the continuous process of competition. According to his theory, a shakeout 
occurs due to economies of scale in research and development (R&D). Larger 
firms have advantages with regard to R&D, whereas newcomers in the later 
stages realize that they have difficulty following larger firms in terms of their 
R&D scale. Following technological developments, the prices of products 
continue declining, resulting in aggravated profitability and a reduction in new 
entries, thereby kicking out lower performance firms, which causes the 
shakeout. Klepper said that this process occurs because it of the focus on 
product innovation at the early stages, followed by process innovation as the 
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industry matures to some extent, and claimed that the above-mentioned 
phenomenon occurs frequently in the process of an innovation-oriented 
industry.  
Other scholars such as organizational ecologists have attempted to explain 
shakeouts by means of the density dependence theory. At the early stages of an 
industry’s evolution, products or systems are not recognized by consumers, but 
the diffusion of products begins as the number of related firms increases, then 
products are more often recognized socially (Carroll & Hannan, 2000). Due to 
the diffusion of products, new large firms enter the industry. However, as the 
level of competition becomes fiercer, firms are kicked out of the race more often, 
thereby creating a shakeout.  
The above-mentioned theories explain the causes of a shakeout, largely 
through two routes. The first explanation of the causes of a shakeout blame 
excessive entries; a large number of competitors enter the industry because they 
expect large profits and market share as they have witnessed in the rapid growth 
of the industry. However, as competition becomes stronger, some of them are 
disappointed and kicked out of the market (Aaker & Day, 1986). Therefore, it 
is a natural consequence that most firms are kicked out of the race quickly, 
because the shakeout occurs soon after the massive increase in the rate of firms’ 
entrance (Horvath, Schivardi, & Woywode, 2001). 
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The second cause of a shakeout is technological development; the 
proponents of this theory believe that there is no causality between excessive 
entry and the occurrence of a shakeout, so the high correlation between them is 
coincidental (Klepper & Miller, 1995). The theories of Utterback and Suarez 
(1993), Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994), and Klepper (2002b), which exclude 
the organizational ecology perspective, see the cause of a shakeout as changes 
in technology; the present paper subscribes to this view.  
 
2.5  Sub-conclusion 
 
This section discusses the changes in industrial environments from various 
dimensions as industries evolve. The focus of innovation moves from product 
innovation to process innovation, while products change from experimental 
products with low purchase willingness to standardized, normalized products. 
In contrast with the early stages of industry, in which small- and medium-sized 
firms are the main actors, the proportion of large-size firms increases in the 
mature stage of industry. Market concentration also gradually increases as the 
industry evolves. In terms of regimes, an industrial environment changes from 
an entrepreneurial regime to a routinized regime.  
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It was also found that the above changes occurred around the time of the 
shakeout phenomenon. Thus, it can be said that the shakeout phenomenon is a 
key part in industries’ life cycles. As such, the shakeout phenomenon not only 
plays an important role in the industry life cycle, but is also a time of many 
firms’ exits. As a result, the discovery of a law of survival during this period 
would be extremely important in terms of the life or death of involved firms. In 
addition, this is a period of big changes in terms of industry structure, which 
may also contribute to related studies.  
Furthermore, the concept of adaptation and selection in evolutionary 
economics would be helpful as a study framework to discover the law 
governing the survival of firms. According to this concept, adaptation and 
selection are not independent concepts from one another, but have to be 
considered simultaneously. Therefore, while studying the survival of firms 
during the shakeout period, the adaptation strategy of firms and selection 
mechanisms of markets should be considered simultaneously. This paper aims 
to identify the law governing survival during the shakeout period by following 
the above theoretical background. First, in the next section, previous studies on 
the survival of firms at the time of a shakeout are summarized from this 
perspective, while formalized facts and the limitations of previous studies are 
derived accordingly.   
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 Adaptation strategies and 
selection mechanisms during the 
shakeout period 
 
3.1  Frame of literature review 
 
Over the last 30 years, a large number of empirical results about the survival 
of firms at the time of a shakeout have been accumulated. However, 
contradictory empirical results have been reported, due to the use of various 
analysis frameworks and heterogeneous data. Therefore, it is necessary to 
summarize the results by dividing them into results that have occurred under 
specific circumstances, and formalized facts that can be generalized. Therefore, 
this chapter aims to summarize previous studies in terms of their perspective of 
the selection and adaptation of evolutionary economics, which is the framework 
of evolutionary economics. The most distinctive characteristic of evolutionary 
economics is the acknowledgement and consideration of dynamics and 
heterogeneity over time. Therefore, previous studies can be summarized with 
the analysis framework used in Chapter 3 to determine whether changes and 
heterogeneity over time were taken into consideration.  
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When summarizing the study results, four major subjects, which were most 
often studied in the empirical analysis related to the survival of firms at the time 
of shakeout, were selected. That is, formalized facts that can be generalized 
from studies on firm size, the entry timing of firms, the experiences of firms 
prior to their entry, and the innovation of firms are derived from within the 
above-mentioned framework. In summary, this chapter verifies whether 
adaptation strategies and changes in industrial characteristics over time are 
taken into consideration, and derives formalized facts with regard to those four 
main areas.   
 
3.2  Adaptation strategies and selection mechanisms 
under shakeout 
 Size of firms 
According to the modeled theory of the industry life cycle, there is a positive 
correlation between the size of a firm and its survival probability. According to 
a model proposed by Utterback and Suarez (1993), firms that cannot achieve 
product standardization and process innovation through dominant design 
cannot win against firms that have achieved them. Large-size firms create 
barriers using economies of scale. As a result, excess production occurs while 
the prices of products decline. This is the primary reason that many firms get 
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kicked out of the competition. Differentiated innovation in a model proposed 
by Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994) plays a role in increasing the optimum 
size of firms. Due to such effects, small- and medium-sized firms are kicked 
out of the market by the larger firms. Finally, according to a model by Klepper 
(2002b), an effect of economies of scale in terms of R&D capabilities induces 
the exit of firms. Since large-size firms have higher expectations on profits due 
to their R&D investment, they have more reasons to invest in R&D than smaller 
firms. Product prices continue declining due to larger firms investing in R&D, 
resulting in smaller firms being unable to compete with them, resulting in a 
greater likelihood of smaller firms exiting from the race.  
In addition, Jovanovic (1982) modeled and analyzed the relationship 
between firm size and survival probability with a function of the theoretical 
efficiency level of firms, which was later extended by Pakes and Ericson (1998). 
In these two studies, the costs faced by newcomers are arbitrary and different, 
depending on firms, while newcomers do not know their own cost structure. 
Their own cost structure and relative efficiency can be learned via the process 
of gaining actual market experience. If their outcomes after entry are better than 
expected, their business size will expand; otherwise, their business size will 
shrink and they will likely be kicked out of the industry. According to the firm 
selection theory, the size of a firm is small at the entry timing, or small enough 
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to produce products at an appropriate volume if required, but it may extend, 
depending on the firm’s outcome after entry. Some entry firms may become 
successful, while a firm that produces an appropriate level of volume may 
remain small or get kicked out of the market entirely, due to deteriorating 
outcomes after entry. As the size of a firm becomes larger after entry, 
disadvantages in terms of product costs become lower, and smaller firms are 
more likely to survive competition against newcomers.  
Through the empirical results, a positive correlation was found between the 
size of a firm and its survival probability. The survival rate of small-size firms 
can be more than doubled as firms grow and their business continues (Phillips 
& Kirchhoff, 1989), and in many industry fields, a reduction in the risk rate of 
newcomers was verified as the size of firms increased (Mahmood, 1992).  
In contrast with the above claims that the larger the size, the better the 
survival, Agarwal and Gort (1996) and Agarwal (1996) suggested that the sizes 
of firms was negatively correlated with the survival of firms, and the direction 
of the relationship between business duration and the survival of firms was not 
unilateral. They used the market life cycle of products and extended business 
duration data to determine the decline point of firms, and found that after this 
point, the longer the business duration, the higher the drop-out rate.  
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There is another claim that the survival probability of firms is positively 
correlated with the size of firms at the early stages of industry evolution 
(Geroski, 1995; Sutton, 1997), but this effect disappears at the mature stage. At 
the mature stage, the window of opportunity to set the standardization of 
products through innovation activity closes, and the most likely method of entry 
at this stage is the finding of a strategic niche. According to the theory of 
strategic niches, a firm remains at a small size, but takes a niche that cannot be 
accessed by larger firms to generate profit as large as those larger firms are 
capable of producing (Caves & Porter, 1977; Porter, 1979). Due to the 
capabilities of small-size firms that look for such strategic niches, small- and 
large-sized firms in the same industry can coexist at the mature stages of the 
industry. In the mature stage of the cycle, the disadvantages due to their small 
scale experienced by smaller firms can be avoided through the strategy of 
taking a strategic niche. Therefore, the size of a firm may enable an advantage 
of reducing the possibility of failure at the earlier stages of industry introduction, 
but it may not have such advantages at the mature stage (Agarwal & Audretsch, 
2001). 
Study results have also suggested that not only the survival rate of firms, but 
also the growth of firms is positively correlated with the size of a firm. Studies 
on the relationship between the size and growth of firms follow the “zebra law,” 
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that the probability to catch the next opportunity is correlated with the current 
size of a firm (Sutton, 1997). Such a relationship between the size and growth 
of firms is accepted as a formalized fact. It can be observed in a number of 
countries, such as the USA (Agarwal, 1997; Audretsch, 1991, 1995a; Audretsch 
& Mahmood, 1995; Dunne, Roberts, & Samuelson, 1988), Canada (Baldwin & 
Gorecki, 1998; Baldwin & Rafiquzzaman, 1995), Portugal (Jose Mata & 
Portugal, 1994; José Mata, Portugal, & Guimaraes, 1995), and Germany 
(Wagner, 1994).  
Previous studies on the relationship between the size and survival rate of 
firms are presented in Table 3, in which whether each of the studies agrees with 
the formalized fact that the size of a firm affects its survival positively, and 
whether each of them followed the characteristics of each stage in the industry 
life cycle are presented.  
 
 Entry timing 
There have been many attempts to verify whether the survival rate of firms 
can differ depending on the entry timing of firms into the industry. These studies 
tried to verify whether the First Mover Advantage is awarded to firms that 
entered the industry at the early stages of the industry life cycle, before the 
industry matured and many other firms join the industry. Most related studies 
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produced the result that early entry was advantageous to a firm’s survival 
(Audretsch, 1991; Cantner, Dreßler, & Krüger, 2006; Klepper & Simons, 2005; 
Lambkin, 1988).  
The reasons for the high survival rate and the advantage of the early entry 
of firms suggested by the studies are as follows. Since early entry firms can 
acquire assets and secure purchasers earlier than others, a switching cost is 
incurred that prevents consumers from moving to other firms’ products, so they 
have advantage of product and process technology over others (Lieberman & 
Montgomery, 1988). In addition, early entry firms can create a variety of entry 
barriers to ward off latecomers. Such entry barriers confer advantages onto 
early entry firms, making their survival more likely. With respect to the scale 
of firms, early entry firms can scale up their business before latecomers enter, 
making it difficult for latecomers to overtake the size of the early entry firms 
that enjoy the First Movers Advantage (Klepper, 1996). In addition, early entry 
firms may make entry barriers not only for their own survival, but also for 
growth (Bartelsman, Scarpetta, & Schivardi, 2005).  
However, there is also a claim that Late Mover Advantage is present, 
depending on circumstances. Early entry firms may risk making design 
developments that will not later become the dominant design (Olleros, 1986). 
In addition, the disadvantages of early entry firms may occur, due to the 
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tendencies of the free-rider effect and inertia (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988). 
As the business duration increases, many innovations have been made, but 
discrepancies between organizational capabilities and demand requirements in 
the current environment will become larger disadvantageously. That is, 
although old organizations can innovate better than newly-created 
organizations, they risk the development of a disparity between what the market 
wants and what the organization is capable of providing (Sørensen & Stuart, 
2000). In addition, early entry firms have a continuous challenge to overcome 
latecomers that enter with superior generic skills (Rothaermel & Hill, 2005; 
Shamsie, Phelps, & Kuperman, 2004). In addition, leading firms that enter the 
industry at an early stage may have spent all their energy in ceaseless 
technological and market creation, or suffered from the earlier-than-expected 
decline of the first generation of technology. That is, firms that enter an industry 
at the time when technology activities are predominant have a higher survival 
rate, because existing firms may suffer from their use of obsolete technologies 
(Agarwal, 1996). 
Moreover, early entry firms may have survival advantages, because of either 
their environment or the time that they entered the industry. If information 
based on experiences that are not transferred is an important input factor in the 
creation of innovation activities, existing firms tend to have the advantage of 
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innovation over latecomers. Furthermore, the accumulation of information 
through market experience by existing firms can be found easily in a more 
mature industry. However, if external information of routines performed by 
existing firms is an important factor in the creation of innovation activities, 
latecomers may have the advantage of innovation over existing firms (Agarwal 
& Audretsch, 2001).  
A number of studies have reported that early entry firms’ advantages change 
around the time of the introduction of the dominant design. In particular, Nelson 
(1995) claimed that early entry firms had no advantage, because accumulated 
knowledge is only effective after the dominant design has been selected. In 
addition, Dowell and Swaminathan (2006) said that although the advantages of 
early entry firms may be acknowledged to some extent, such an effect will only 
be effective before the dominant design, since the entry of firms after the 
dominant design is advantageous due to the resolution of such uncertainty. The 
above two claims may sound contradictory, but both can be re-interpreted 
according to the time of industry development as follows. Early entry firms are 
at an advantage until the dominant design appears, but the knowledge is 
initialized again as soon as the dominant design has been determined, so that 
the advantages of early entry firms disappear, whereas newly entered firms have 
a First Mover Advantage.  
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However, in contrast with a claim by Nelson (1995) that knowledge is 
initialized upon the dominant design’s appearance, Suarez and Utterback (1995) 
accentuated that the experiences of creating product designs that are not chosen 
as the dominant design can also be advantageous. In addition, existing firms 
may have more advantages than newly entered firms in terms of their 
complementary capabilities such as learning ability, marketing, or logistics 
(Buenstorf, 2007; Rothaermel & Hill, 2005; Sosa, 2009).  
Most studies acknowledge the existence of the First Mover Advantage, but 
skepticism over the First Mover Advantage has arisen in some more recently 
created industries. The technological advantages of early entry have been 
maintained in past industries, but such effects cannot be maintained in recent 
studies (Buenstorf, 2007) so the First Mover Advantage through information 
advantage cannot be enjoyed as much as in the early 1900s (Agarwal & Gort, 
2001). 
Previous studies on entry timing are presented in Table 4, in which whether 
each of the studies agrees with the formalized fact that the early entry of firm 
affects survival of firms positively, and whether each of them have followed the 





 Experiences prior to the entry 
Studies related to experiences prior to entry are interested in the survival rate 
of de novo firms that have no experience in other related industries prior to the 
entry and de alio firms that have experience in related industries or enter by 
means of spinning off. Most previous studies have derived that the survival rate 
of de alio firms was higher than that of de novo firms. When radio 
manufacturers entered the TV manufacturing market, their survival rate was 
high (Klepper, 2002b) while the survival rate and achievements of firms that 
entered the computer hard disk industry through spin-off were higher than firms 
that entered without spin-off (Agarwal, Echambadi, Franco, & Sarkar, 2004). 
The survival rate of de alio firms in the automobile (Klepper, 2002a) and 
fashion industries were similarly higher (Wenting, 2008).  
The reason for the claim that de alio firms have more advantages in the 
above papers is because experiences obtained from related industries are not 
only helpful but can also utilize complementary assets and networks easily. For 
example, experiences in logistics, distribution, or marketing areas can be 
advantageous factors in newly entered industries.  
In addition, not only are the networks accumulated by firms beforehand 
advantageous for survival of firms, but also the network capabilities of firm 
owners. This is because firm owners who are can depend on wide and various 
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ranges of personal networks and businessmen who can gain assistance from 
such networks are more likely to be successful (Persson, 2004). This supports 
the fact that a network of firms or business owners is likely to increase their 
survival rate. 
However, in contrast with study results that have shown that de alio firms 
have survival advantages, claims that de novo firms are more able to survive 
than de alio firms can also be found. Khessina and Carroll (2008) claimed that 
the difference of new product development cycles is related to the difference of 
survival. This is because de novo firms tend to be able to be able to work faster 
in the cycle of new product development than de alio firms. This can be 
interpreted as there being more pressure on de novo firms to create a distinct 
identity in the market. In addition, it was explained that experiences in other 
related industries, as mentioned earlier, as advantages of de alio firms cannot 
be applied to every industry, as they are more dependent on technological 
characteristics and entry timing (Bayus & Agarwal, 2007).  
There is another claim that the difference in survival between de novo and 
de alio firms can be found depending on a time in the industry life cycle. De 
alio firms have a lower risk rate in the early stages of the industry life cycle, 
but after the early stage, they have a higher risk rate compared to de novo firms. 
This is because de alio firms have high opportunity costs while they remain in 
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the market (Agarwal, 1997). That is, de novo firms have no choice but to 
concentrate on the current industry, while de alio firms could be kicked out of 
the industry even if they are profitable but have a low earning rate compared to 
other new opportunities. However, it can be seen that de alio firms have 
advantages to their survival until the shakeout time.  
Previous studies on experiences prior to entry are presented in Table 5, in 
which whether each of the studies agrees with the formalized fact that de alio 
firms affect survival positively and whether each of them follow the 
characteristics of each stage in the industry life cycle are presented. 
 
 Innovativeness 
There is no disagreement with the concept that innovative firms are capable 
of long-term survival. Innovation is insurance against failure (Cefis & Marsili, 
2006) and technological activity increases the chances of survival (Agarwal, 
1996). 
However, the assessment of innovation has been performed in empirical 
analysis in a great variety of ways. For example, the following assessment 
methods have been reported in previous studies: The level of adoption of the 
latest generation technologies (Lawless & Anderson, 1996); the level of 
adoption of the dominant design (Christensen, Suárez, & Utterback, 1998); 
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proximity to the leading technology (Fontana & Nesta, 2009); the adoption rate 
of radical manufacturing technologies and their application (Sinha & Noble, 
2008); the number of patents produced per year (S. Wagner & Cockburn, 2010); 
the outcome of certification contests (Rao, 1994); and new product releases 
(Agarwal, 1998; Bonaccorsi & Giuri, 2001; Gort & Klepper, 1982; Greenstein 
& Wade, 1998; Haupt, Kloyer, & Lange, 2007). In addition, Gort and Klepper 
(1982) assessed the levels of innovation by dividing them into minor and major 
innovations with the help of experts through surveys, while other studies 
divided it thus: Innovation that destroys existing technological competences 
and capabilities, and innovation that enhances existing technological 
competences and capabilities (Tushman & Anderson, 1986). However, there 
have been no studies on the changes in innovation effects according to the stage 
in the industry life cycle among the studies into innovation. 
Previous studies on innovation are presented in Table 6, in which whether 
each of the studies agrees with the formalized fact that innovation affects the 
survival of firms positively and whether each of them have followed the 






3.3  Sub-conclusion 
 
The following formalized facts are derived from the literature analysis. First, 
it was found that the larger the size of a firm, the higher its survival probability. 
Depending on the stage in the industry life cycle, the size effect may be 
weakened once the industry is stabilized after a shakeout, because strategies 
that utilize niche markets may be employed.  
Second, with respect to the entry timing of firms, the earlier a firm enters an 
industry, the higher their general survival probability. This result is obtained 
because the early entry of firms can preempt information or distribution 
networks, and early entry firms have advantages in customer preemption. 
However, after a shakeout, early entry firms may feel fatigued due to their 
necessary continual innovation activities. In particular, after the dominant 
design appears, the knowledge that was accumulated by early entry firms may 
become obsolete, removing such early advantages. It should also be noted that 
any firm can chase the leading firm quickly through imitation in modern 
industry, so that the advantage effect of information, which was effective in the 
early 1900s, may not be the same as in the early 1900s. Therefore, it was 




Third, it was found that the experiences of other related industries prior to 
entry helped an increase survival probability. This is because distribution 
networks, reputation, knowhow, and assets accumulated via related industries 
were helpful to the entry of a firm into a new industry. However, as competition 
becomes fiercer, profit margins become narrower. As a result, firms that 
perform business activities in other industries tend to get kicked out of the 
industry quickly in consideration of opportunity costs. In addition, firms that 
had no prior experience may find it difficult to survive, but once they have 
managed to survive, they tend to have better outcomes than firms with prior 
experience. This means that as an industry evolves, the chances of survival for 
de novo firms that have had no experience prior to their entry will increase.  
Finally, with regard to innovation, there was no exception that all innovative 
firms had high survival probabilities. However, studies related to innovation 
did not provide differentiated results over time. Changes in the role of 
innovation over time cannot be understood via previous studies yet. Moreover, 
a more multidimensional approach is required for this study area rather than 
only considering simple innovation costs or the number of patents that have 
been produced. 
These studies have limitations in terms of the following three viewpoints. 
First, most studies did not differentiate the stages in the industry life cycle so 
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that they did not represent changes in technological uncertainty or technological 
regimes over the industry life cycle. In particular, studies on entry timing to 
industries and experiences prior to the entry showed different results according 
to the stage of the industry life cycle depending on used data. Therefore, a study 
on survival of firms requires analysis with a more fine division of the stages of 
an industry’s life cycle.  
As for the second limitation, most previous studies saw firms as entities that 
were passively selected, simply by the selection mechanism of markets. As 
discussed earlier, the adaptation efforts of firms are also considered when the 
selection mechanisms of markets are identified. Although the adaptation 
strategies of firms were considered in studies modeling the industry life cycle, 
most empirical analysis studies did not include the adaptation strategies of firms, 
except for studies related to innovation. Even studies related to innovation 
suggested only simple adaptation strategies that allowed firms to be innovative, 
while failing to consider various adaptation strategies related to technology.   
Finally, studies related to innovation of firms were generally vague in 
assessing the innovation of firms and simplified assessment of innovation 
excessively. In particular, the number of patents produced may not be 
appropriate to analyze the early phase of an industry as a proxy variable of 
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innovation. This is because the patent rate in a new industry is not high in many 
cases (McGahan and Silverman, 2001).  
To overcome such limitations in identifying the selection mechanism at the 
shakeout period, the following elements are required. First, stages and changes 
in industrial environments according to the industry life cycle should be taken 
into consideration. Second, differences between recent and old industries 
should be taken into consideration. Third, adaptation strategies of firms should 
be considered in a multifaceted manner. Fourth, not only adaptation strategies 
of firms but also selection mechanisms in previous studies should be considered 
together.  
Therefore, this study aimed to test the hypothesis that adaptation strategies 
and selection mechanisms differ according to time prior to a shakeout, time of 
shakeout occurrence, and time after shakeout. 
To test this hypothesis, empirical analysis was conducted with regard to the 
US automobile industry in the early 20th century (Chapter 4) and mobile 
industry in the early 21st century (Chapter 5). Through this empirical analysis, 
it is expected to derive the law of survival within a framework of adaptation 
and selection in evolutionary economics. In addition, it is expected to provide 
effective strategic implications for firms to discover their roles proactively 
through application of the proposed method.  
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Table 3, Table 4, Table 5, and Table 6 show previous studies on sizes of 
firms, entry timing, experiences prior to the entry, and innovation, respectively. 
Each table includes authors and publication year of previous studies, 
(geographical) source and industry of data used, whether or not a study satisfies 
the formalized fact, and whether classification was done by criteria of the 




Table 3. Summary of previous literatures about the effect of firm size 
 Authors (Year) Country Industry Stylized Facts Period    
Classification 
Dunne, Roberts, & Samuelson (1988) US Panel data Positive No 
Phillips & Kirchhoff (1989) US Panel data Positive No 
Audretsch (1991) US Panel data Positive No 
Mahmood (1992) US High & Low Tech Positive No 
Utterback & Suarez (1993) US TV, Typewriters, Transistor, 
Calculators 
Positive Yes 
Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994) US Automobile Positive No 
Jose Mata & Portugal (1994)  Portugal Panel data Positive No 
Wagner (1994) Germany Panel data Positive No 
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Audretsch & Mahmood (1995) US Panel data Positive No 
Agarwal and Gort (1996) US 25 products Negative Yes 
Agarwal (1996) US High & Low Tech Negative Yes 
Agarwal (1997) US Panel data Positive Yes 
Pakes & Ericson (1998) US Panel data Positive No 
Baldwin & Gorecki (1998) Canada Panel data Positive No 
Agarwal & Audretsch (2001) US 33 products Positive Yes 







Table 4. Summary of previous literatures about the effect of entry timing to the market 
 Authors (Year) Country Industry Stylized Facts Period    
Classification 
Willard and Cooper (1985) US TV Positive No 
Olleros (1986) Europe, US Watch Negative No 
Christensen and Rosenbloom (1995) US Disk Drive Negative No 
Swaminathan (1996) US Beer Positive No 
Henderson (1999) US PC Positive No 
Sorensen and Stuart (2000) US Bio Tech., Semiconductor Positive No 
Klepper and Simons (2000) US Tire Negative Yes 
Klepper  (2002) US Automobile, PC Positive Yes 
Van Kranenburg et al. (2002) Netherlands Newspapers Positive No 
Shamsie et al. (2004) US Household appliances Negative No 
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Rothaermel and Hill (2005) US PC, Steel, Telecom Negative No 
Dowell and Swaminathan (2006) US Bicycle Positive No 
Dowell (2006) US Bicycle Positive No 
Kim and Park (2006) Korea Mobile Telecom Positive No 
Boschma and Wenting (2007) UK Automobile Positive No 
Buenstorf (2007) Germany Bicycle Negative No 
Cantner et al. (2009) Germany Automobile Positive No 




Table 5. Summary of previous literatures about the effect of prior experience before entrance 
   Authors (Year) Country Industry Stylized Facts Period    
Classification 
Holbrook et al. (2000) US Semiconductor Positive No 
Klepper and Simons (2000) US TV Positive Yes 
Klepper (2002) US Automobile, PC Positive No 
Chesbrough (2003) World Disk Drive Negative No 
Agarwal et al. (2004) World Disk Drive Positive Yes 
Nerkar and Roberts (2004) US Pharmaceutical Positive No 
Cattani (2005) UK Fiber optics Positive No 
Klepper and Sleeper (2005) US Laser Positive Yes 
Thompson (2005) US Shipbuilding Positive No 
Klepper (2007) US Automobile Positive Yes 
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Boschma and Wenting (2007) UK Automobile Positive No 
Buenstorf (2007) Germany Laser Positive No 
Bayus and Agarwal (2007) US PC Negative Yes 
de Figueiredo and Silverman (2007) US Printer Positive No 
Madsen and Walker (2007) US Transport Negative No 
Khessina and Carroll (2008) US Disk Drive Positive No 
Wenting (2008) World Fashion Positive No 
Simons and Roberts (2008) Israel Wine Positive No 
Cantner et al. (2009) Germany Automobile Positive No 






Table 6. Summary of previous literatures about the effect of firm’s technological innovativeness 
 Authors (Year) Country Industry Stylized Facts Period    
Classification 
Dowling and Ruefli (1992) US Telecommunications Positive No 
Henderson (1993) US Photolithographic Positive No 
Rao (1994) US Automobile Positive Yes 
Lawless and Anderson (1996) US PC Positive No 
Christensen et al. (1998) US Disk Drive Positive No 
Tegarden et al. (1999) US PC Positive No 
Roberts and Amit (2003) Australia Retail Banking Positive No 
Jones (2003) US Semiconductor Positive No 
Giarratana (2004) US Encryption Software Positive No 
Roy and McEvily (2004) US Machine Tool Positive No 
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Wezel and van Witteloostuijn (2006) UK Motorcycle Positive No 
Giarratana and Fosfuri (2007) US Security Software Positive No 
Sinha and Noble (2008) UK Metal and Engineering Positive Yes 
Cantner et al. (2009) Germany Automobile Positive No 
Fontana and Nesta (2009) Worldwide LAN Switch Positive No 




 Adaptation strategies and 
selection mechanism in the US 
automobile industry 
 
4.1  Empirical research of US automobile industry 
 
Successful adaptation and selection mechanisms derived from previous 
studies summarized in the previous chapter are: high innovative firms, firms 
entering at the early stage of industry evolution, large size firms, and firms that 
had prior experiences in related industries. However, the above factors, other 
than innovation, are difficult to be changed at will by firms. That is, firms in 
previous studies are regarded as entities that are chosen passively by the market 
environment. Thus, previous study results have limitations in their ability to 
provide sound strategic implications for firms.  
This is not to negate the fact that a firm is an entity chosen by the market 
mechanism. Rather, it asserts that adaptation efforts by firms shall be included 
in the analysis in addition to the selection mechanism. Firms have different 
backgrounds and experiences, so that each firm pursues a different type of 
innovation (Klepper, 1996). This means that there is extensive diversity in R&D 
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innovation and product level in newly created industries. It is also evident that 
a difference of prior experiences before the entry (Boeker, 1989; Carroll, 
Bigelow, Seidel, & Tsai, 1996; Holbrook, Cohen, Hounshell, & Klepper, 2000; 
Klepper & Simons, 2000) and/or a difference of decision making on how to 
create a business (Baron, Burton, & Hannan, 1999) also manifest differences in 
how to compete as well as in performance outcomes. In addition, trial and error 
of new entry firms may accentuate a difference in the market position (Dosi, 
1982; Henderson & Clark, 1990; Tushman & Anderson, 1986). Therefore, it is 
necessary to include adaptation strategies of firms in the analysis.  
Moreover, there are many other facts that cannot be explained by the 
formalized facts summarized in Chapter 3. For example, a claim that a large-
size firm dominates a market overly simplifies a fact. However, with respect to 
the distribution of firm sizes, in reality, as a later stage of industry approaches, 
difference of scale is expanded and maintained thereafter (Coad & Rao, 2008; 
Malerba & Orsenigo, 1996). 
There was an attempt to reflect the adaptation effort of firms before. In early 
days of related studies, some effort was made to consider heterogeneous 
adaptation strategies of firms. For example, a model proposed by Gort and 
Klepper (1982), which was regarded as the first attempt to model the evolution 
of industries, proceeded from the viewpoint of evolutionary economics by 
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dividing a source of innovation into information from within an industry and 
information from outside that industry. Although a model based on the 
evolutionary economics reflected adaptation efforts of firms, such as 
accumulation of knowledge and absorption of knowledge from outside, to 
survive in their industry, it did not provide empirical results that reflected 
adaptation efforts of firms, since it circumvented the empirical analysis with 
the neoclassical economic analysis. A later model (Utterback and Suarez, 1993) 
also did not reflect the adaptation efforts of firms, because it saw that dominant 
design was given externally from the outside and firms just followed the trend. 
In other words, this model portrayed that firms that cannot acquire the dominant 
design are kicked out from the industry, thereby facing a shakeout; however, 
even firms that followed technologies other than dominant design can also have 
an ability to follow the dominant design through adaptation efforts. Nonetheless, 
such efforts of firms were not reflected in previous studies.  
The reason for this failure of reflection of adaptation strategies in previous 
studies is due to difficulties in finding objective indicators or data that represent 
the adaptation strategies of firms. To resolve such a problem, this paper used a 
method that observes characteristics of products released by firms. This product 
analysis study approach has been used in a field of business administrative 
studies due to the characteristic of product analysis. However, firms are in 
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contact with consumers through their products and, ultimately, survival of firms 
is decided by consumers’ choice to the extent that they are most directly related 
to the operating principle of the market. Therefore, this study aimed to refine 
the characteristics of products released by firms into variables of firm level, 
thereby identifying the adaptation efforts of firms. Through this attempt, this 
study aimed to identify objective variables of adaptation strategies from the 
technological viewpoint of firms.   
This chapter aims to identify adaptation strategies from the technological 
viewpoint by utilizing of product-level data released by firms and determine the 
effect of the identified adaptation strategies on survival of firms at the shakeout 
period to overcome the limitations of previous studies. In addition, this chapter 
also discusses interactions between factors that influence the survival of firms 
identified via previous studies and adaptation strategies.  
Through this study, it is expected to disclose the selection mechanism at the 
shakeout period in consideration of adaptation strategies of firms in order to 
identify strategic implications that can be applicable to firms.   
In Section 4.2, adaptation strategies are identified through study design and 
hypothesis setup and detailed study hypotheses are presented. In Section 4.3, a 
methodology that converts data of product level into adaptation strategy 
variable of firm level is explained along with the analysis model. In Section 4.4, 
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empirical analysis results using the USA automobile industrial data in the early 
20th century are presented. In Section 4.5, a summary and implications of 
Chapter 4 are presented.  
 
4.2  Study design and hypothesis 
 
 Analysis of product level 
It is not an easy task to observe adaptation strategies of firms. In particular, 
this difficulty is aggravated in studies related to evolution of an industry. This 
is because a long period of time passes from industry creation to maturity and, 
thus, a relatively long history is prerequisite for an industry to be analyzed. For 
this kind of analysis, financial data of firms is likely to be insufficient, and a 
survey-based approach is impractical. To overcome this limitation, the present 
study employed product data released in the past. Through this method, it is 
expected to derive adaptation strategies of firms in a more objective manner.  
As such, not only does use of product data address the insufficient data 
problem, but also the product itself has an important role in a market. First, 
products play an important role in connecting markets and firms. If products 
are not accepted in a market, the corresponding firm is likely to be kicked out 
from the market. That is, firms are competing with one another through 
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products. Furthermore, products play a great role in proposing a number of 
theories. Competition between products provided a foundation on which the 
strategic management theory was based (Porter, 1979) as well as providing core 
issues of theories concerning buying in transaction cost economics (Williamson, 
1975). Products also play an important role in the industry life cycle in this 
study (Klepper, 1996).  
However, there has been no study on the analysis of industry evolution by 
utilizing microscopic data at the product level, while the analysis of product 
level has been studied within a framework of business administration (Carroll, 
Khessina, & McKendrick, 2010). Therefore, it is expected that this study will 
play an important role as an interdisciplinary study that connects business 
administration and economics. 
In the next section, a number of adaptation strategies are explained through 
products of firms.  
 
 Technological level of firms 
As discussed in Chapter 3, studies on technological level or innovation of 
firms had limitations with respect to the assessment of technological level of 
firms. For example, existing studies presented R&D cost, the number of patents, 
or survey with experts, which only represented some effort of technology 
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innovation, rather than assessment of technological level. Such variables are 
only indirect indicators if the variables are not applied to real products. 
Therefore, the present study aimed to assess technological level of firms 
directly by utilizing product-level data.  
The above-mentioned previous studies related to innovation showed that 
high innovative firms had a high survival rate. In this regard, it is expected that 
technological level would be in a positive correlation with survival of firms 
while it would be in a negative correlation with an exit rate of firms.  
According to a theory proposed by Klepper and Simons (2005), the reason 
for the survival of early entry firms at the shakeout time was because firms 
performed innovation using the early entry advantage. However, as firms stay 
longer and longer, malfunction of their structure and process can be found more 
and more to induce political internal division, redundant organizational routines, 
or malfunctioning departments (Carroll & Hannan, 2000). As a result, firms 
that entered later may be more innovative than early entry firms. In addition, 
early entry firms may also be threatened by firms that entered later with more 
advanced general-purpose technologies (Rothaermel & Hill, 2005; Shamsie et 
al., 2004). Accordingly, technological advantage of early entry firms is 
expected to be valid only until Phase I or Phase II. Therefore, the effect may 
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disappear in Phase III; that is, the technological advantage of firms that entered 
later is expected to be advantageous to survival of firms.   
 
 Technology increase rate of firms 
The Red Queen effect (Barnett & Hansen, 1996) in organizational 
evolutionary theory refers to the principle that a firm is left behind in 
competition in a relative sense, even if a firm performs innovation but the 
competitors and surrounding environment perform better innovation. The name 
of this effect is derived from Alice in Wonderland in which people in the Red 
Queen’s kingdom cannot move forward because the surrounding environment 
is also moving together with them. Leigh Van Valen (1973), an evolutionary 
theorist, employed this term to express a chasing and being chased parallel 
relationship in the ecosystem. This phenomenon refers to a situation in which 
even if a firm has a high technological level, that firm can be overtaken by 
competitors at any time if it exhibits low technological growth.  
In addition, products in the early stage are primitive in general, so the 
willingness to pay is low (Agarwal & Bayus, 2002). Therefore, it is expected 
that a technological increase rate in Phase I could be more important than a 
technological level itself. The reason for this is because the dominant design is 
not yet established, and most products are unlikely to meet the consumer’s 
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requirement in terms of technological level at this stage. Therefore, consumers 
are likely to be affected more by the technological increase rate than 
technological level itself.  
Furthermore, organizations are always learning. Firms should keep learning 
how to survive in a fierce competition that is particularly pronounced in the 
early stage of an industry. Moreover, firms can survive when they respond 
actively to changes in industrial environment and other competitors. To achieve 
this, firms operate processes for adaptation. In this regard, technological 
increase rate is expected to be an important factor for survival of firms in Phase 
I. 
 
 Product dispersion of firms 
This subsection aims to analyze how the difference in adaptation strategies 
generalist and specialist firms is displayed according to the evolutionary stage 
of the industry via the product dispersion strategy of firms. In general, 
generalist firms tend to be suitable for stable environment, while specialist 
firms are suitable for rapidly changing environment (Utterback & Suarez, 1993). 
However, the above result may be overturned if an entry timing of the dominant 
design is considered in the industrial evolution stages. That is, when various 
products are manufactured, a risk-diversification effect may be obtained, 
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though capability cannot be focused and it is difficult to imprint specialized 
images of products on the consumer's mind. Early entry firms at the early stage 
compete with one another to dominate product design. Although it is unlikely 
to occur, success leads to a high growth rate. Therefore, a risk-diversification 
strategy that increases the probability of the product to be included in the 
dominant design by releasing a variety of products will be effective at the early 
stage of industry evolution; however, after the dominant design appears, 
specialist firms that are focused on the dominant design will be advantageous. 
In contrast, the window of opportunity to set the standardization of products 
through the innovation activities will be closed at the mature stage. This is 
because radical innovation is less prevalent in the entry at the mature stage, 
which aims to take a strategic niche (Newman, 1978; Porter, 1979). Under such 
circumstance, specialist firms are expected to enjoy a survival advantage. 
 
 Product differentiation of firms 
A product differentiation strategy of firms plays an important role in 
adaptation strategies, too. This strategy can be broadly divided into two: a 
strategy that concentrates on a niche market and a strategy that imitates the 
dominant design of an industry. Since the dominant design is already formed in 
the shakeout period, an imitation strategy may be more effective. It is also true 
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that since the dominant design is forming at the early stage of industry evolution, 
it would be advantageous to imitate products in the product family that is likely 
to become the dominant design by identifying the trend of other firms. However, 
it would be advantageous to develop unique images by attempting product 
differentiation at a later, stabilized, stage of industry evolution.  
Such an effect may be more evident at the later stage of industry evolution 
depending on the firm size. It has been asserted that once the dominant design 
is established, only the mature stage of industry evolution can witness co-
existence of small and large size firms in the same industry at the same time 
thanks to capability of small size firms that take strategic niches (Caves & 
Porter, 1977; Newman, 1978). That is, according to the theory of strategic niche, 
a firm remains small but inhabits a niche that cannot be accessible to larger 
firms. In the mature stage in the cycle, disadvantages due to small size 
experienced by small companies can be overcome through the above strategy, 
which targets the strategic niche. Therefore, where firm size is small, a product 
differentiation strategy is expected to be advantageous to survival in the Phase 
III period.  
In addition, a product differentiation strategy may affect the survival of 
firms differently depending on the entry timing. Due to the preemptive 
excessive density of existing firms, new entry firms are forced to release their 
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products in a surrounding empty space. Moreover, firms that entered later 
generally employ a strategy focused on a single market segment (Bonanno, 
1987; Schmalensee, 1978). Existing firms place their products near existing 
products in general; however, once their products are threatened by new entry 
firms, existing firms tend to locate their products far away from the dense area 
(Stavins, 1995). Therefore, it would be advantageous to latecomers’ in the late 
stage of industry evolution survival if they employ a product differentiation 
strategy.  
 
4.3  Analysis model 
 Survival analysis 
Survival analysis was conducted using the Cox Proportional Hazards Model 
with Time Varying Covariates (Cox, 1972). The Cox proportional hazards 
model is a widely used method to analyze risk factors that influence the survival 
of firms. This model is non-parametric in the sense that it does not assume any 
kind of distribution type with respect to a survival time, whereas this model is 
parametric in the sense that the regression coefficient is estimated.  
The Cox proportional hazards model has many benefits in analysis of 
survival data of firms. The survival data in the survival analysis is composed of 
data from a certain set starting point to an occurrence point of event. Unlike 
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statistics that deal with continuous variables, the survival data should take not 
only survival time but also occurrence of event into consideration 
simultaneously. Moreover, since the survival data does not follow a normal 
distribution, it cannot be analyzed using a general regression model. If a Probit 
or Logit model, which used an occurrence of event as a dependent variable, is 
used, then a survival time cannot be considered at the same time. In the survival 
analysis, interrupted data is not excluded from the analysis but is utilized to 
obtain a baseline hazard, which is advantageous due to the use of interrupted 
data. For example, even in cases where the event did not occur within the 
analysis period or there is a failure to trace whether an event occurred or not, 
such data is not excluded from data analysis. In addition, the Cox proportional 
hazards model with time varying covariates can include time varying covariates 
so that dynamic analysis can be possible. 
A hazard function is shown in Equation (4.1), while a hazard function at 
time t  represents a conditional probability that a firm that survived up to time 
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The basic model of the Cox proportional hazards model at time t  is shown 
in the following Equation (4.2). Here, 0( )h t  refers to a baseline hazard 
function, in which values of all independent variables are equal to 0. kx is an 
independent variable that influences survival duration,T . It is interpreted with 
respect to kβ  that whenever kx  increases by one unit, a risk level increases 
by exp( )kβ times. 
 
0 1 1 0( ) ( )exp( ) ( )exp( )k kh t h t x x h t xβ β β′= + + =         (4.2) 
 
If time varying covariates are included in the basic Equation (4.2), the Cox 
proportional hazards model with time varying covariates will be given by 
Equation (4.3). jx represents a characteristic that does not change over time, 
while itx represents a characteristic that changes over time. A likelihood 
function with respect to time 1, , dt t  is shown in Equation (4.4). 
 















                     (4.4) 
 
In this paper, data is divided according to the division of the industry life 
cycle stage, and variables that influence survival in each stage are derived. For 
the analysis, survival durations of all firms are re-set on the basis of a starting 
point of a corresponding analysis period. A method of how to divide the 
industry life cycle stage is described in detail in a later section.    
The Cox proportional hazards model used for the analysis is shown in 






































           (4.5) 
 
_ iSize dummy  represents size of a firm, while _ _ iFirst mover dummy  
represents an early entry firm. _ itTechnology level , Technology
_ itgrowth , _ itProduct dispersion , and _ itProduct difference  refer to 
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technological level, technological increase rate, product dispersion, and product 
differentiation variables, respectively, and they change over time. The first two 
variables, which are derived via previous studies, are ones that influence 
survival of firms, while the latter four variables are ones that represent 
adaptation strategies of firms. The reason for processing size of firm as a 
dummy variable is to have consistency with respect to the second analysis in 
which adaptation strategies might differ by size of firm. Note that a dummy 
variable was used to represent a size variable to make it easier to understand 
the meaning. How to derive variables and used data will be explained in more 
detail later. 
The second empirical analysis aimed to determine the relationship between 
each adaptation strategy variable and formalized facts disclosed through the 
previous studies, which were conducted to find out how the effect of adaptation 
strategy can differ by firm size. Equation (4.6) is a survival analysis model 
according to size, which includes a size dummy and interaction term of each 
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The third empirical analysis aimed to determine whether there is a difference 
of effect by the adaptation strategy between early entry firms and the other firms, 
such that survival analysis was conducted by using an early entry dummy as an 
intersection term. A survival analysis model according to the entry timing is 
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 Division of time by shakeout 
A way to divide a stage in the industry life cycle followed the three-phase 
division proposed by Dinlersoz and MacDonald (2009). As explained earlier, 
this paper is focused on a shakeout, so the use of three-phase division such as 
prior to, during, and after shakeout time is appropriate for the purpose of this 
study. This division has a distinctive advantage since the peak time of the 
number of total firms entered is divided into Phase I and Phase II. Therefore, a 
beginning of Phase II, which represents a start time of shakeout, was classified 
on the basis of a time when the number of total firms entered was the maximum. 
One way to divide the industry life cycle in general is by checking a graph 
above all other methods rather than using a quantitative way (Dinlersoz & 
MacDonald, 2009; Gort & Klepper, 1982). Therefore, Phase III was selected as 
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a time when a net entry was converged to 0 as a change in trend was observed 
according to the definition of Phase III, in which a net entry was nearly close 
to 0. To resolve the ambiguity of the division of time, later sections will explain 
more about historical events at the time. Here, historical events are briefly 
summarized. The first conveyer transfer method was employed in the Model T 
of Ford released in 1908, followed by a wide adoption of this method by other 
companies. As a result, many companies that could not meet the low price were 
kicked out of the industry, creating a shakeout. Due to the success of this, the 
market share of Ford increased to more than 50%. However, GM achieved a 
top market share for the first time in 1927 through full line and model change 
strategies, which were competing against the low price product strategy of a 
single product of GM. Then, the Big Three of the US automobile industry were 
established with the entry of Chevrolet, which aimed at customers in a middle 
layer between Ford and GM. Then, since 1927, there has been no significant 
change in a market share of US car industry for 87 years, which was regarded 
as the stabilization period. Therefore, the year of 1927 can be seen as the 





 Technology assessment of products using the Hedonic 
price model 
Prior to the identification of adaptation strategies by firm level, it is 
necessary to identify the technology level of their products. However, this 
analysis is difficult because a product is composed of many various attributes. 
To simplify the attributes of a product with multidimensional characteristics 
into a single indicator, the hedonic price model has been most popular (Combris, 
Lecocq, & Visser, 1997; Griliches, 1961).  
The hedonic price model assumes that the value of goods and services are 
determined by the characteristics contained in those goods or services (Rosen, 
1974). That is, the model assumes that consumers buy a bundle of 
characteristics contained in goods or services. Equation (4.8) shows a general 
equation of the hedonic price model with respect to products (Fontana & Nesta, 
2009; Stavins, 1995). 
 
mit j jm t t mit
j
P zβ α µ ε= + + +∑                 (4.8) 
 
mitP is an indexed value of time t , firm i , and price of product m , which 
uses a deflated value; jmz represents the j -th technological characteristic of 
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product m , which is also indexed as same as in the case of price. In addition, 
jβ  represents a hedonic price or potential price. tµ and tα  represent a firm 
dummy at time t  and a year dummy at time t , respectively.  
A technology level was calculated by multiplying ˆ jβ  estimated through 
regression of the hedonic price model and technological factor of each product. 
For example, if horsepower and fuel efficiency of a vehicle are used as 
technological factors, potential prices increased by one unit of horsepower and 
one unit of fuel efficiency are derived by the regression result. A price in terms 
of technological viewpoint is derived by multiplying these two prices. That is, 
assuming that mitT is a technology level of product m of company i at time t , 
a technology level is expressed by Equation (4.9). The price-related strategic 
characteristic by manufacturing company is not included in technology and is, 
thus, the effect due to manufacturing company is excluded.  
 
ˆmit mit iT p µ= −                    (4.9) 
 
A technology level derived through the hedonic price model represents a 
technology level in a product level. Therefore, an additional process is needed 
to derive variables in a firm level.  
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 Adaptation strategy variables of firms 
The adaptation strategy variables of firms use indexes in a product level 
derived in terms of technological viewpoint, as explained in the previous 
subsection. In this subsection, a procedure and method that can derive outcomes 
at a firm level are explained using data in a product level. Therefore, all 
variables derived in this subsection refer to variables in a firm level.  
 
4.3.4.1 Technological level of firms 
A firm releases various products every year; however, in this study, the 
product of the highest technology level was defined as the technology level of 
a firm. Nonetheless, technological advancement occurs at a fast pace every year 
so that a technology level of an old product should be relatively low. Therefore, 
technology level was divided by the highest technology of the entire industry 
at a corresponding year. As a result, _ itTechnology level of firm is within a 
range of 0 and 1, which is expressed by Equation (4.10). max( )itT refers to 
the highest level of a product manufactured by company i  at time t , while 
max( )tT  refers to the highest-level product in the entire industry at time t . 
Technology level of firm and technology improvement rate, which will be 
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explained in the next subsection, are used based in part on study by Fontana 








=             (4.10) 
 
4.3.4.2 Technology improvement rate of firms 
Technology improvement rate of firms means the increase rate of technological 
level of a firm derived in the above. Technology improvement rate was calculated 
by dividing a technology level increased from time 1t −  to t  by a technology 
level at time 1t − . Note that when a product of the highest technology level was 
exited and a new product not released, this value may have a negative value, as 

















4.3.4.3  Product dispersion of firm 
The product dispersion variables of firms followed a method used in Feenstra 
and Levinsohn (1995). In previous studies, these variables were used to verify 
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whether there was a difference of dispersion of product between existing and newly 
entered firms.  
_ itProduct dispersion  refers to how widely products of a firm are dispersed 
in a market. Since product dispersion tends to increase over time, dispersion in an 
industry level was considered only in this study. A level of dispersion at the firm 
level can be expressed by Equation (4.12). A level of dispersion at an industry level 
is expressed by Equation (4.13), while _ itProduct dispersion , derived by 



























         (4.12) 
 
mitT  refers to a technology level of product m manufactured by company 
i  at time t , while itT refers to a mean technology level of firm, which is 
calculated by a sum of all technology levels of all products released by company 
i  at time t  by the number itM  of products released by company i  at time 
t . itσ refers to a dispersion level of company i  at time t , which indicates the 
distances of all products released by company i  at time t  from the mean 
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technology level of firm. To precisely calculate a distance, a square root should 
be used. However, since it represents a rate of dispersion level of firm to a 
dispersion level of industry, there is no difference between them in terms of 
actual outcome.    
As explained earlier, as a market grows, a dispersion level can be changed. 
Therefore, a dispersion level of the entire industry was calculated first as 
follows, and then compensated for using a rate of dispersion level between firm 



























          (4.13) 
 
As in the above equation, ntT  refers to a technology of product, n , 
manufactured by company i . A mean technology level of industry was then 
calculated by dividing it by the number of total products existing in the industry, 
tN , and then a mean distance of all products existing at time t  is calculated. 
A dispersion level of industry derived using the above method is equivalent to
tσ . Dispersion level itσ of firm level derived above is divided by a dispersion 
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level tσ of industry level, thereby deriving _ itProduct dispersion as 






=            (4.14) 
 
4.3.4.4 Product differentiation of firms 
There are two methods to assess product differentiation. One is a method of 
using a minimum distance between products (Jeoung, 2003), and the other is a 
method of assessing a mean distance to all products (Stavins, 1995). A method 
of using a minimum distance between products is advantageous to a study on 
benchmarking strategy for a single product. However, since this method targets 
only a single product, it is difficult to derive outcomes at a firm level. For 
example, if there is only a single product in a niche market and a firm releases 
a similar product, it would be appropriate to see this as a niche market strategy. 
Therefore, this study follows the method of Stavins (1995) because it aims to 
identify a trend in a firm level. A firm will decide whether they release a product 
in a market that has no product currently by referring to past products, or release 
a new product in their main product family. The former means a strategy that 
pioneers a niche market, while the latter means an imitation strategy. In other 
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word, the latter can be interpreted as following the dominant design. For this 
strategy, a comparison between products released at time 1t −  and products 
released at time t  is required. Equation (4.15) represents a differentiation 
























        (4.15) 
 
1tN − , mitT , and 1ntT −  refer to the number of products at time 1t − , 
technology level of product m  manufactured by company i  at time t , and 
technology level of product n at time 1t − , respectively. It refers to a mean 
distance between 1tN −  products existing at time 1t −  and product m released 
at time t  by company i . A mean is calculated by dividing a product dispersion 
variable of product m  released by company i  at time t  by the total number 
of products released by company i  at time t , itM , hereby deriving
_ itProduct difference , a product differentiation level of company i  at time t . 





















4.4  Empirical analysis  
 The US automobile industry 
The birthplace of the car was Europe. This is because Europe started the first 
research on internal combustion engines and transmissions that are smaller and 
lighter than steam engines. A German named Nicholas Otto tested and 
manufactured a 2-cycle engine in 1878; based on this engine, two men named 
Benz and Daimler successfully manufactured the first car with an internal 
combustion engine. Then, Benz founded an automobile manufacturing factory 
in 1886 and produced their own-designed three-wheel vehicles for the first time.  
However, France was the first nation to accept cars. The noble class of 
Germany disrespected a new technology as they kept their traditional value, 
whereas France was open-minded on new technologies such as the car. That is, 
Germany developed cars while France created a market, creating a condition in 
which the nascent automobile industry could emerge.  
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There was demand for cars in the high classes in Europe with relatively good 
road conditions for the time. On the other hand, the USA is a huge country, and 
their road condition was bad except for in several large cities. Thus, the 
automobile industry in the USA started later than in Europe. The first general-
purpose car in the USA was the Curved Dash from Oldsmobile in 1901, and the 
Model A was released by Ford in 1903. Although the USA entered the 
automobile industry later than Europe, it was able to accelerate the development 
of their automobile industry because of their mass production technology 
advancement.  
The contributions to the US automobile industry development were thus 
thanks to the conveyor belt system of Ford and the release of Model T. The 
mass production via the conveyor belt system could produce a large of number 
of cars in a cost effective manner. This system affected the world automobile 
industry significantly beyond the USA automobile industry. Cadillac also 
manufactured a variety of cars, starting from cars with single cylinder engines 
in 1905 to luxury cars with four-cylinder engines. Then, Cadillac merged with 
GM and became the archetypical luxury car. Behind the success of Cadillac was 
part compatibility, which was a basis of the mass production system. In fact, 
behind the conveyor belt system of Ford, the achievement of Cadillac of part 
compatibility was the main reason of the success of Ford.  
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The Model T of Ford is an important milestone in the US automobile history. 
The Model T, first introduced in 1908, was equipped with a water-cooled, 4-
cylinder, 2,896 cc, 20 horsepower engine and manufactured via the conveyor 
line of Ford for the first time. An average car price then was more than $2,000, 
but the Ford T was priced just at $950 and reduced to $290 by 1927 thanks to 
continuous price reduction. On the strength of this, Ford concentrated on Model 
T production, and its market share reached 50%, selling more than 15 million 
cars until it began to be phased out in 1927.  
The success of Ford ignited an introduction of the conveyor system 
throughout the US automobile industry. Thanks to this, the USA annual 
automobile production was 187,000 cars in 1910 then 2.227 million cars in 
1920, a ten-fold increase in just 10 years. As a result, the USA then accounted 
for more than 90% of the world automobile production.  
However, as the US average household income improved, GM started 
challenging the Ford Model T, which was manufactured with only black color 
due to price reduction, by releasing a variety of new models of cars 
consecutively. Then, Ford, which had never lost its top market share from 1906 
to 1926, gave up the lead to GM in 1927. GM then retained its preeminent 
position for 76 years. After this, Chrysler that released six-cylinder and four-
wheel vehicles targeting middle layer customers between Ford and GM, 
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forming so called Big Three of the US automobile industry. Then, the US 
automobile industry entered into a stabilization period without any change in 
ranking.  
 
 Data and variables 
4.4.2.1 Data 
The US automobile industry data was used to determine the effect of the 
adaptation strategies of firms on survival of firms at the time of shakeout. This 
study utilized data of product level in order to derive adaptation strategies of 
firms. Therefore, this study used automobile product data from 1905 to 1943. 
A total of 474 firms were included in the analysis period, with a combined 
21,337 vehicle models. The Old Car Reference Library data provided by the 
Classic Car Database was utilized. The data includes product performance data 
of 61 areas such as release time, price and horsepower at the release time, the 
number of cylinders, wheel base, engine volume, and size of wheel. Vehicles 
driven by steam engines and electricity were found in the analysis period, but 
they were removed due to significant differences of technological criteria. In 
addition, only US-based firms were included in the analysis. This was because 
the proportion of imported cars in the USA was considerably small during the 
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analysis period (Feenstra, 1988) and overseas-based firms may distort the 
survival analysis. 
Since the above data did not contain information about firms, size of firm 
was obtained using the yearly production volume data of firms provided by 
Peiler (2004) and yearly passenger car production volume in the US provided 
by the U.S. Census Bureau to calculate market share in comparison with 
production.  
With respect to experience variables prior to entry, some firms had prior 
experiences in bicycles and wagons industries before entering the automobile 
industry; however, these were not used for the analysis due to an insufficient 
amount of data.  
The automobile industry is a traditional manufacturing industry, which had 
a clear shakeout. Thus, it was considered to be appropriate to test the hypotheses 
in this paper. In addition, the automobile industry is classified as a machinery 
industry and has had (and still has) ramifications for the whole economy as a 
key industry (Klepper, 2002a).  
The following Figure 3 shows changes in entry, exit, and the total number 
of firms over time. In this figure, division of time according to the three-phase 
classification of Dinlersoz and MacDonald (2009) was shown, as explained in 
the previous section. Phase I and Phase II were divided on the basis of time 
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when the number of firms was the largest, while Phase II and Phase III were 
divided on the basis of a time when net entry was converged to 0. Figure 4 
shows change in net entries per year in the automobile industry. Accordingly, 
Phase I was set to the time up to 1911, while Phase II was between 1912 and 
1927, and Phase III was from 1928 to the last year. The number of firms 
increased in some years of Phase II when a shakeout occurred, which was a 
unique characteristic of the automobile industry. However, to the best of the 
present author’s knowledge, no previous study has mentioned this phenomenon. 
Nevertheless, this phenomenon may be explained in part by looking closely 
into the characteristics of the automobile industry. After the dominant design is 
established, changes in production methods such as factory facility replacement 
are required to produce products that follow the dominant design. Still, the 
automobile industry requires a broad range of changes in not only production 
lines but also in related parts industries. Therefore, it was likely to delay the 
ramification of the introduction of the dominant design due to this wide range 
of change requirements. Given this delay effect, the short stabilization period 
during the shakeout time might occur. In addition, the ambiguity of the 
dominant design felt by firms at that period may also be an indirect part of the 
reason for the retrograde period of shakeout.  
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There were two positions regarding the dominant design in the automobile 
industry. Since the dominant design is not clearly defined yet, it cannot be 
concluded that neither of the positions is wrong. One position is to see the 
dominant design on the basis of All Steel and Closed Body car manufacturing 
in terms of technological elements so that the dominant design started from the 
year of 1923 (Suarez & Utterback, 1995). The other position is to see the 
dominant position as conferred by market dominance, in which case the 
dominant design started from 1908 when the Ford Model T was released. The 
Ford Model T was sold from 1908 to 1927 for 18 years, selling 15 million cars 
(O'Hearn, 2007). This product is regarded as having pioneered the US 
automobile industry. Therefore, the dominant design was created gradually 
since the successful product was introduced in the market until the technically 
unified standard was set up. Thus, it was possible to see the shakeout 












Figure 3. The number of exit and entrance firms in automobile industry 
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As explained above, performance data of products will be indexed through 
the hedonic price model before adaptation strategy variables are derived. The 
basic statistical data of variables used in the hedonic price model are shown in 
Table 7. As an index to represent automobile performance, horsepower, 
Bore/Stroke ratio, the number of main bearings, size of tire, and the number of 
seats were set. Among 62 variables included in the data, many had a high 
correlation with each other, so that some variables to be used were limited. For 
example, horsepower and engine volume had a high correlation with each other, 
as more difference was generated in engine horsepower by the increase of 
engine volume rather than changes in efficiency due to technological 
advancement. Accordingly, only horsepower was used for the analysis. 
Correlations of the technological characteristic variables used are presented in 
Table 8.  
There were considerable differences found compared to variables used in 
modern cars. For example, no technological characteristic concerning fuel 
efficiency was defined in the early 1990s because fuel efficiency was not 
regarded as important, whereas main bearings were regarded as important at 
that time and, thus, were included in the analysis. The analysis result of the 
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hedonic price model is shown in Table 9. R2 was 0.9061; thus, the explanatory 
power seems sufficient.  
 
Table 7. Descriptive statistics of variables related to technology and 
attributes of automobile 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
(1) Horsepower (HP) 67.387 39.096 1.5 320 
(2) B/S ratio 0.747 0.100 0.5 1.333 
(3) Main bearings 4.347 1.800 2 9 
(4) Tire size (cm) 71.427 19.480 30.480 113.034 
(5) Number of passengers 4.599 1.638 1 10 
 
 
Table 8. Correlation table of variables related to technology and attributes 
of automobile 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(1) Horsepower (HP) 1.000      
(2) B/S ratio 0.207* 1.000     
(3) Main bearings 0.223* -0.058* 1.000    
(4) Tire size (cm) -0.025* 0.074* -0.289* 1.000   




Table 9. Result of hedonic analysis in automobile industry 
 Coefficient Std. Err. 
(1) log Horsepower (HP) 0.292*** (0.012) 
(2) log B/S ratio 0.199*** (0.011) 
(3) log main bearings 2.488*** (0.081) 
(4) log Tire size (cm) 0.123*** (0.014) 
(5) log No. of passengers 1.029*** (0.020) 
Constant 0.210 (0.260) 
Year Dummy ( Included ) 
Firm Dummy ( Included ) 
No. of Observations 13962 
Adjusted R2 0.9061 
Notes: The values in parentheses are standard errors; *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
The variables finally used in the survival analysis are presented in Table 10. 
They consist of a size of firm and early entry-related variables derived via 
previous studies, and adaptation strategy variables such as technology level, 
technology increase rate, product dispersion, and product differentiation 
variables. The adaptation strategy variables were derived by converting 
product-level data into firm-level variables using the previously mentioned 
method. Table 11 shows the basic statistics about variables to be used in the 
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analysis and Table 12 shows comparison of firm strategic variables by firm 
characteristics, while Table 13 presents their correlations.  
Figure 5 shows yearly product distribution on the basis of technology level 
of products indexed through the hedonic analysis. This graph shows a 
frequency distribution table of corresponding characteristics over time. It is a 
plan view of a three-dimensional graph (time, frequency, and characteristic 
value). A high peak means that new products with a corresponding technology 
level or characteristic are dense. As the graph shows, products are evolved 
while it forms a mountain-like shape. The ridge of the mountain-like shape is a 
technological trajectory. Such a trajectory corresponds to the dominant design. 
In the case of the automobile industry, peaks and ridges are formed gradually, 
and the highest peak is formed between 1912 and 1913. The technological 
characteristic of the Ford Model T is located in this peak. Additionally, Figure 
6 and Figure 7 show the yearly frequency distribution of product with respect 
to engine volume and wheel base, respectively. During the shakeout period, 
product density is gradually decreasing, and then the additional product line is 





Figure 5. The distribution of variable related to level of technological 
competence in automobile industry 
 
























































Figure 7. The distribution of level of displacement in automobile industry 
 
Table 10. Summary of independents variables in survival analysis of 
automobile firm 
Variables Summary 
_ _First mover dummy  Enter during stage I, then first mover dummy 
equal 1. 
_Size dummy  Market share top 10. 
_Technology level  Level of firm’s technology. 
_Technology growth  Increase rate of firm’s technology level. 
_Product dispersion  Dispersion ratio of firm’s products 
















Table 11. Descriptive statistics of firm strategic variables in automobile 
industry 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
_ _First mover dummy  2109 0.234 0.424 0 1 
_Size dummy  2109 0.111 0.314 0 1 
_Technology level  2109 0.960 0.019 0.859 1 
_Technology growth  2109 0.455 1.103 -7.567 4.379 
_Product dispersion  2109 0.125 0.228 0.000 2.026 




Table 12. The comparison of firm strategic variables by firm characteristics 
in automobile industry 
Variable  Top 10 Non Top 10 Early Entry Late Entry 





































Table 13.  Correlation table of firm strategic variables in automobile 
industry 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(1) _ _First mover dummy  1.000      
(2) _Size dummy  0.140* 1.000     
(3) _Technology level  0.132* -0.126* 1.000    
(4) _Technology growth  0.019 0.005 0.113* 1.000   
(5) _Product dispersion  0.147* 0.052* 0.015 0.114* 1.000  
(6) _Product difference  0.095* 0.053* -0.286* -0.134* 0.000 1.000 
 
 
Figure 8. The change of level of overall technological competence by the 

















































Figure 8 shows the yearly technology levels measured by industry level 
among the derived variables in the above. Technology increase was in decline 
temporarily at the shakeout period; however, in general, of the trend was 
upward sloping. 
To interpret the basic statistics with regard to adaptation strategies of 
survived and kicked-out firms, box plots of adaptation strategy distribution of 
each firm type by time are presented in Figure 9 to Figure 12. In the case of 
technology level, a difference of adaptation strategies between survived and 
kicked-out firms was not found over the whole period. However, in the case of 
the technology increase rate, there was a difference of distribution prior to the 
shakeout period, and technology increase rate of survived firms was higher than 
that of kicked-out firms. With respect to product dispersion, no difference of 
strategy distribution was found. On the other hand, with respect to technology 
differentiation, kicked-out firms took differentiated product strategy prior to the 
shakeout, while survived firms adopted differentiated strategy during the 
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Figure 9. The comparison of technology level of survival and non-survival 
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Figure 10. The comparison of technology growth of survival and non-
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Figure 11. The comparison of product dispersion of survival and non-
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Figure 12. The comparison of product difference of survival and non-
survival firms by shake out period classification 
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 Survival analysis result 
In this subsection, empirical analysis results of the Cox proportional hazards 
model are presented and explained to derive and discuss adaptation strategies 
and selection mechanism in the automobile industry centered on the shakeout 
period. The analysis in the automobile industry consists of three models. The 
first analysis is a basic model, in which the effects of size and entry timing of 
firms derived through previous studies and technology level, technology 
increase rate, product dispersion, and product differentiation suggested as 
adaptation strategies of firms on survival of firms are determined. The 
regression result is presented in Table 14. Depending on the shakeout time 
division, results can be different; thus, we had different time divisions (one and 
two years before and after the selected period). The empirical results for these 
divisions are presented in the Appendix; these are not significantly different 
from the regression results contained in this paper. Thus, we believe our result 
is robust. 
Next, to determine whether a difference of adaptation strategy and selection 
mechanism (that is control effect) is present depending on firm size and entry 
timing derived via previous studies, regression results of the Cox proportional 
hazards model, in which dummy variables are used as interaction terms, are 
shown in Table 15 and Table 16, respectively.  
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All analyses were done by dividing the data into prior to shakeout, during 
shakeout, and after shakeout. In addition, dependent variables represent a 
hazard ratio, in which a negative correlation means a positive effect on survival, 
while a positive correlation means a negative effect on survival.  
 





_Size dummy  -40.081*** -36.327*** -35.765*** 
 (0.446) (0.411) (0.491) 
_ _First mover dummy  -0.894*** -0.828*** -0.936* 
 (0.208) (0.264) (0.539) 
_Technology level  0.295 0.204 1.389 
 (0.795) (0.833) (1.240) 
_Technology growth  -0.016* 0.008 -0.017 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.021) 
_Product dispersion  -0.076 0.043 -0.102 
 (0.072) (0.061) (0.114) 
_Product difference  0.111* -1.098** 0.801** 
 (0.059) (0.503) (0.383) 
Log Likelihood -393.3 -232.3 -83.48 
Observation 233 1458 418 
Notes: The values in parentheses are standard errors; *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. 
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The regression result in the basic model showed that a size dummy and an 
early entry dummy had a negative correlation over the entire range. That is, 
these results are consistent with the formalized facts derived through the 
previous studies. However, coefficients of product dispersion and technology 
level showed no significant result.   
Next, the regression results with respect to adaptation strategies are as follow. 
First, a coefficient of a technology increase rate is -0.016 prior to the shakeout 
period, indicating that it was advantageous to survival. This is inconsistent with 
the hypothesis that since product quality does not satisfy consumer’s demand 
in the early stage of industry, technology advancement at a faster rate is needed 
(Agarwal & Bayus, 2002). However, the coefficient of product differentiation 
at this time was 0.111. This means that an imitation strategy is more effective 
than product differentiation. This is in opposition to the result concerning the 
hypothesis mentioned in the above. The meaning of this result can be 
interpreted as follows. Since the dominant design is not firmly established in 
the early stage of industry, firms need to see the direction or behavior of other 
firms and imitate the main released products. Conversely, the dominant design 
is not established at a particular point. Rather, it is a process of finding a 
consensus through continuous imitations of many firms.  
114 
 
In contrast, the result at the shakeout period showed that the coefficient of 
product differentiation was -1.098. That is, survival rate of firms that attempted 
differentiation was higher than that of firms without differentiation. This was 
also a different result from the hypothesis. Previously, since a shakeout is a time 
after the dominant design was established, it was expected that products that 
did not follow the dominant design, which implied a similar product, would be 
kicked out. However, survival rate of firms that attempted differentiation was, 
unexpectedly, higher. If the shakeout period is interpreted as a time that most 
firms are kicked out and swept away by a big wave, firms may believe that they 
needed to release different products than others in order not to be swept away.  
It was found that, an imitation strategy is advantageous to survival of firm 
again after the shakeout period. Here, the coefficient of product differentiation 
was 0.801. That is, after an industry is stabilized, adaptation strategy through 
imitation again raised survival rate. This is interpreted as indicating that firms 
that manufacture products formalized in each segment would have an 
advantage, as the segment of a product that is pioneered through differentiation 
strategy in the shakeout period is firmly established.  
In summary, prior to the shakeout period, firms need an adaptation strategy 
that imitates potential dominant design products as they pay attention to 
products of other firms, while during the shakeout period, most firms are kicked 
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out, so they need an adaptation strategy of product differentiation from other 
firms to survive the cull.  
Next, it will be discussed how these adaptation strategies and survival 
mechanisms are changed depending on the size of firms. The survival analysis 
result according to the size of firm is shown in Table 15, while the survival 
analysis result according to the entry timing is shown in Table 16.  
The method of interpretation of interaction terms is as follows. An example 
of how to interpret the technology level variable that did not multiply the 
interaction term in Equation (4.4) and its coefficient value 
1 _Technology levelγ × , as well as the technology level variable that used a 
size dummy as interaction term and its coefficient value 
2 _ _Technology level Size dummyγ × × , is given here. 1γ  is a derived 
value regardless of size of firms. This is because all data in large-sized and 
small and medium-sized firms is used to estimate 1γ . However, in the case of
2γ , only when a size dummy is 1 is it included in the estimation equation. 
Therefore, 2γ means a marginal effect or control effect of large sized firms. In 
this case, care will be taken not to interpret 1γ  as an effect of small and 
medium sized firms. Therefore, the reason for the estimation of models with 
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interaction term is to determine whether the effect of adaptation strategies can 
differ depending on size or entry timing of firms. Table 15 presents the 
differentiated effect of variables that used interaction terms. The analysis result 
showed that variables that do not use interaction terms in each model did not 
show any contradictory result against the basic model presented in Table 14, 
while no strategies were changed by size of firm and entry timing of firms. 
Therefore, the same result as that shown in Table 14 was derived. However, a 
control effect of strategy variables was the same as shown in Table 17. That is, 
although adaptation strategies that were advantageous to survival differed 
according to time on the basis of shakeout, the adaptation strategies were not 
different by size or entry timing of firms. However, only marginal effect was 






















_Size dummy  -36.442*** 2.041** -2.525** 
 (0.796) (0.956) (1.244) 
_ _First mover dummy  -0.870*** -1.072*** -1.064** 
 (0.199) (0.295) (0.496) 
_Technology level  0.160 0.193 1.622*** 
 (0.770) (0.270) (0.570) 
Size × _Technology level   0.004 -0.031* -0.055 
 (0.006) (0.018) (0.036) 
_Technology growth  -0.014* 0.021** -0.029 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.019) 
Size × _Technology level  0.023 -0.016* 0.003 
 (0.023) (0.009) (0.015) 
_Product dispersion  -0.090 -0.137 11.624*** 
 (0.070) (0.132) (3.222) 
Size × _Product dispersion  0.061 0.124 -11.780*** 
  (0.119) (0.133) (3.217) 
_Product difference  0.101* -0.797* -1.061 
 (0.060) (0.458) (0.715) 
Size × _Product difference  -0.115 0.770* 1.428** 
 (0.174) (0.462) (0.721) 
Log likelihood -418.7 -575.9 -46.01 
Observation 233 1458 418 
Notes: The values in parentheses are standard errors; *, ** and *** indicate statistical 












_Size dummy  -36.343*** -43.533*** -38.635*** 
 (0.433) (0.432) (0.513) 
_ _First mover dummy  -0.797 -1.023 -2.074*** 
 (0.619) (0.684) (0.693) 
_Technology level  -0.205 0.915 1.092 
 (0.327) (0.746) (1.710) 
First × _Technology level   0.022 0.064** -0.143** 
 (0.022) (0.030) (0.066) 
_Technology growth  -0.014* -0.006 -0.037 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.023) 
First × _Technology level  0.013* 0.024 -0.012 
 (0.007) (0.017) (0.039) 
_Product dispersion  0.043 0.038* 0.209 
 (0.081) (0.023) (0.152) 
First × _Product dispersion  -0.098 0.009 -1.569** 
  (0.165) (0.105) (0.680) 
_Product difference  0.006 0.114 0.702 
 (0.156) (0.226) (0.559) 
First × _Product difference  -0.274 -1.618* 5.582*** 
 (0.304) (0.826) (1.813) 
Log Likelihood -213.6 -211.0 -45.23 
Observation 233 1458 418 
Notes: The values in parentheses are standard errors; *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 17. The moderating effect of firm characteristics on survival analysis in automobile industry 
 Moderating effect of large firms Moderating effect of first mover firms 
 Pre-Shakeout Shakeout Post-Shakeout Pre-Shakeout Shakeout Post-Shakeout 
_Technology level  
. Effect 
increased  










_Product dispersion  
. . Effect 
increased 
. . Effect 
increased 













This chapter showed how adaptation strategies and selection mechanism 
were changed depending on the evolutionary process on the basis of shakeout 
using product data from the US automobile industry.  
There are selection and adaptation laws in the survival law in evolutionary 
economics. However, few studies have been conducted on adaptation strategies. 
Thus, this study aimed to overcome this limitation using product level data to 
consider the adaptation strategies.  
Survival analysis was conducted in consideration of technology level, 
technology increase rate, product dispersion, and product differentiation 
variables derived from data of product level and size and entry timing of firms 
studied mainly in previous studies. Three analysis results were derived using 
the Cox proportional hazards model: the first analysis used a basic model, the 
second analysis used a model in which a size dummy of firm was used as 
interaction term, and the final analysis used a model in which an entry timing 
dummy was used as interaction term. The main results are as follow. 
Regardless of the evolutionary stages of industry, large size and early entry 
firms had high survival rates in all ranges, which is inconsistent with the 
formalized facts in previous studies. With respect to the adaptation strategies, 
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different adaptation strategies were derived depending on time of the cycle. 
Prior to the shakeout, product differentiation strategies had a negative effect on 
survival probability. That is, an imitation strategy was advantageous to survival 
in this period. This result indicated that firms need to review products from 
other firms and require adaptation strategy that imitates potentially dominant 
design products prior to the shakeout. This result hinted at how the dominant 
design is formed such that the dominant design is not given from the outside 
but is formed via a kind of consensus through imitation by firms in the same 
industry.  
In addition, this period showed that technology increase rate had a positive 
effect on survival. This is also interpreted as meaning that most products in the 
early stage may not satisfy the consumers’ requirements so that it is necessary 
to heighten the technology increase rate.  
It is also found that a product differentiation strategy during the shakeout 
period influences survival of firms positively. It was expected that since this 
stage is comes after establishment of the dominant design, it would be 
advantageous to imitate the dominant design products. However, our result 
showed the opposite to be the case. The reason for this outcome can be 
interpreted as indicating that a shakeout period is a time when most firms are 
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kicked out, so that firms need product differentiation strategies that differ from 
those of other firms in order not to be swept away by the exit wave.  
From the model that used interaction terms with size of firms, it was found 
that adaptation strategies taken by large and small-and-medium firms were 
different from each other, while there was no noticeable difference of 
adaptation strategy between early entry firms and other firms in the analysis 
that used interaction terms with entry timing.  
As can be seen in this chapter, adaptation strategies and selection 
mechanisms only for the shakeout period are present. Interestingly, most firms 
are kicked out of the industry during the shakeout period, while only a few firms 
survive as they were selected by the market environment. Therefore, it is 
required to behave during the shakeout period contrary to common sense 
derived from previous studies. That is, kicking out most firms is the selection 
mechanism in a shakeout, while behaving in the opposite way to common sense 




 Adaptation strategy          
and selection mechanism            
in the mobile industry 
 
5.1  Empirical research of mobile industry 
This chapter aims to determine whether there is a change in adaptation 
strategy and selection mechanism in firms during the shakeout period in 
comparison with the automobile industry discussed in the previous chapter and 
whether there exist a difference in commonly discovered adaptation strategies 
and selection mechanisms.  
The US automobile industry in the previous chapter is classified as a 
traditional manufacturing industry, while the mobile industry is an Information 
and Communication Technology (ICT) device industry. The two industries 
differ in terms of industry characteristics. In addition, the automobile industry 
was created in the early 20th century, while the mobile industry was developed 
in the early 21st century. Therefore, due to the advanced economic and business 
theories, adaptation strategies that were effective in the past may not work today. 
For example, there would be no advantage to early entry firms in terms of 
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knowledge preemption since imitation of knowledge has been quicker in recent 
industries than in the past (Nelson, 1995). 
In addition, there is a difference in product characteristics. For example, the 
repurchase cycle of vehicles as durable goods is much longer than that of 
mobile products. There is also a difference of product life cycle between them. 
The product life cycle of mobile products has been shortening more and more, 
and is much shorter than that of vehicles (Bayus, 1998).  
One other characteristic is that the automobile industry in the past was 
formed by the entrance of small size firms into the industry at the early stage 
(O'Hearn, 2007), while the current mobile industry has been formed by large-
size firms who already produced other electronics products such as Samsung 
Electronics or LG Electronics.  
Due to the above reasons, there would be a difference in adaptation 
strategies that are advantageous to survival of firms in the mobile industry in 
contrast with automobile industry, including selection mechanisms.  
Therefore, in this chapter, a common survival law is derived through 
analysis of adaptation strategies and selection mechanisms in the mobile 
industry, and the effect of changes in environment by time or industry 




5.2  Study design and hypothesis 
 Technological level of firms 
As found in previous studies, there will be no difference in survival rates 
according to technology level of firms. In the automobile industry, the semi-
medium-sized passenger car is the best-selling product rather than the highest 
technology product. On the other hand, in the mobile industry, the best-selling 
products are products with a relatively high technology level among product 
families, as shown by Samsung’s Galaxy S series. Therefore, it is expected that 
a technology level of firms would be more influential on survival of firms in 
the mobile industry than the automobile industry.  
Furthermore, as explained in the above, this study overcomes the ambiguity 
of assessment of technology level, as shown in previous studies on technology 
level, or innovation of firms, to assess a technology level in mobile analysis 
directly through product analysis. 
 
 Technology increase rate of firms 
In the mobile industry, the Red Queen effect (Barnett & Hansen, 1996) can 
also occur. As explained before, this phenomenon refers to a situation in which, 
even if a firm has a high technological level but with low technological growth, 
that firm can be overtaken by competitors at any time. A product life cycle of 
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the mobile industry is shorter than that of the automobile industry, and mobile 
technology has been advanced in a short time so that the effect of the technology 
increase rate in the mobile industry will play a more important role compared 
to the automobile industry.  
It is expected that such an effect would be more important in the early stage 
of the industry than other stages. This is because products in the early stage are 
primitive in general, so the willingness to pay is low (Agarwal & Bayus, 2002). 
Therefore, if a firm has a fast technology increase rate to satisfy the consumer’s 
requirement, that firm might by recognized as an innovative firm. That is, a 
technology level of a firm in the mobile industry would play a positive role in 
the survival of a firm, and this effect would be stronger than in the automobile 
industry. It is also expected that this effect would be more important in the early 
stage of the industry than in other stages.  
 
 Product dispersion of firm 
This subsection aims to analyze how differences between generalist and 
specialist adaptation strategies are displayed according to the evolutionary 
stage of industry via the product dispersion strategy of firms. As explained 
previously, if we consider the introduction time of the dominant design in the 
evolutionary stage of industry, a dispersion strategy through a variety of product 
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families would be effective prior to the introduction of the dominant design. 
That is, when various products are manufactured, a risk-diversification effect 
may be obtained, though capability cannot be focused and it is difficult to 
imprint specialized images of products on consumers’ minds. Early entry firms 
at the early stage compete with one another to dominate product design. 
Therefore, a risk-diversification strategy that increases probability of a product 
to be included in the dominant design by releasing a variety of products will be 
effective at the early stage of industry evolution; however, after the dominant 
design appears, specialist firms that are focused on the dominant design will 
have an advantage. 
However, the mobile industry, in contrast with the automobile industry, does 
not incur much cost to develop a product line; thus, most firms in the mobile 
industry are more likely to perform product dispersion than those in the 
automobile industry are. Therefore, it is rather expected that this effect would 
not exist in the mobile industry.  
 
 Product differentiation of firms 
As discussed in the above, the product differentiation strategy of firms can 
be broadly divided into two: a strategy that targets a niche market, and a strategy 
that imitates the dominant design. It is expected that an imitation strategy would 
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be advantageous in the shakeout period since the dominant design is already 
established. Therefore, it would be advantageous to imitate potential dominant 
design products in the early stage of industry by looking closely into a trend of 
products in other firms, since the dominant design is still being established in 
this period. However, it would be advantageous to develop unique images by 
attempting product differentiation at the later stage of industry evolution, which 
is stabilized.  
Such an effect may be more evident in the mobile industry at the later stage 
of industry evolution depending on the firm size. It was viewed that once the 
dominant design is established, only the matured stage of industry evolution 
can bring the co-existence of small and large size firms in the same industry 
thanks to the capability of small size firms that take strategic niches (Caves & 
Porter, 1977; Newman, 1978). That is, according to the theory of strategic niche, 
a firm remains small but inhabits a niche that cannot be accessible by larger 
firms. In the mature stage in the cycle, disadvantages due to small size 
experienced by small companies can be overcome through the above strategy. 
Therefore, where firm size is small, a product differentiation strategy is 





5.3  Analysis model 
 Survival analysis 
As in the analysis in the automobile industry, the Cox proportional hazards 
model was used to conduct survival analysis. The general equation in the Cox 
proportional hazards model is the same as explained above. However, there is 
a difference of variables used for survival analysis. As explained above, it is 
noticeable that firms with experience in electronic or computer industry enter 
in the mobile industry. Therefore, _De novo dummy , a dummy variable of 
prior experience, was included in the analysis. If a firm had no experience in 
related industries and then entered into the mobile industry, it is assigned a 
value of 1, and if a firm had experiences in other related industries, it is assigned 
a value of 0. The Cox proportional hazards model used for the analysis is shown 
















































The hypothesis was that there would be a difference in adaptation strategy 
and selection mechanism according to a size, entry timing, and prior experience. 
Therefore, analysis was conducted by inserting adaptation strategy variables 
and other variables in the interaction terms. The reason for not using an analysis 
method by dividing analysis data was because this cannot identify a difference 
of groups with analysis on separated data. For example, if the direction of the 
coefficient value is different between large and small-and-medium size firms, 
its interpretation may be easy. However, if both of them had a positive 
correlation, then it cannot be claimed by comparison of coefficients that large 
size firms are more advantageous than small-and-medium size firms. Therefore, 
an analysis method that uses interaction terms was chosen. The Cox 
proportional hazards model based on size, entry timing, and prior experience 
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 Adaptation strategy variable 
The identification of the adaptation strategy variables is the same as shown 
in Chapter 4. Since indexed values of product data through the hedonic price 
model are used similarly to in the automobile industry analysis, an 
identification process of adaptation strategy and equations can be applied as in 
the automobile industry analysis. That is, through the methods used in Chapter 
4, variables of technology level, technology increase rate, product dispersion of 






5.4  Empirical analysis 
 Mobile industry 
In 1947, the Bell Laboratory developed a cellular technology that can 
communicate continuously by connecting to nearby stations while moving. The 
first mobile phone was DynaTAC, developed by the Motorola in 1973. It was a 
prototype that was only successful in test communication, weighing 1.3kg. 
Subsequently, Motorola released the commercial mobile phone DynaTAC 
8000x series in 1983. The price was $3,995, and it weighted 0.7kg. With 10 
hours of charging time, this phone only allowed a half-hour phone call. 
Motorola released the StarTac 7760 series in 1998 through continuous 
development efforts. This was the first folder type mobile phone in the world, 
which sold more than 75 million phones. The market share of Motorola reached 
around 60% at that time. In 1998, Nokia (from Finland) overtook Motorola 
through the low-price phone sale strategy, targeting developing countries, and 
became the world's No. 1 company. Then, Nokia introduced a platform business 
model since 2000 that managed only high-value-added sectors, while the other 
sectors were outsourced. Nokia provided low- and medium-priced mobile 
phones that accounted for 60% of their total sales via a unified platform through 
the platform business model and can perform product development with use of 
standardized modules. That is, Nokia was able to gain the top market share with 
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their strategy of volume sales of simple products with cheap price in the entry 
level market, just as Ford did in the US automobile industry. This strategy was 
highly successful and culminated in the Nokia 1100 released in 2003, which 
sold more than 200 million units around the world as a single model.  
In the communication technology, there was also significant advancement. 
Originally, it was an analog method, which was called a first generation 
communication, and only a few firms existed in the market at this time. Since 
1996, a mobile industry was established in earnest by the commercial second 
generation communication, which is distinguished from the first generation 
because of the transformation from analog to digital signals. In this period, there 
was a fierce competition in communication technology between the CDMA 
mode supported in the USA and Korea and the GSM mode supported in Europe. 
Then, the third generation communication with video phone capability was 
released onto the market. Even in this period, WCDMA as a successor to the 
GSM mode and CDMA2000 as a successor to the CDMA mode were in 
competition. From 2011 to now, the fourth generation, called LTE mode, which 






 Data and variables 
5.4.2.1 Data 
Data of the mobile industry can be obtained via information in a large 
number Internet web pages that review mobile products. Among them, GSM 
ARENA contains data of the most diverse range of products. Thus, we extracted 
data of mobile products from GSM ARENA using data mining. The extracted 
data includes data of all mobile products released around the world. We did not 
single out a country due to the characteristic of the mobile industry, selling 
products all around the world. A total of 5,508 products were found in the data 
and, among them, 3,416 feature phone products were targeted in the analysis. 
The reason for selecting only feature phones for the analysis is explained in 
detail below. The analysis period was set to 1994 to 2012. The reason for this 
is also explained later. In this analysis period, 94 firms and 26 sets of product 
performance-related data were included. A dummy variable for size of firm was 
used to have a value of 1 for the top 10 firms based on market share by sales 
volume. The use of dummy variables was to have consistency in the analysis, 
including interaction terms analyzed later. The prior experience of firms was 
verified via their web pages. Some firms, like Motorola, had no experience prior 
to entry, while some telecommunication firms, like Vodafone, even 
manufactured other mobile devices prior to entry. It was also found that firms 
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with prior experience in electronic industries such as computer manufacturers 
were also actively entered to the mobile industry. Finally, some firms like Bosch 
entered from the machinery industry.  
The mobile industry technology has advanced much in the short time since 
commercialized products were released in 1994. In particular, recently-released 
smartphones have been advanced to have similar functions as computers, such 
as document creation and editing as well as a panoply of application programs 
(Theoharidou, Mylonas, & Gritzalis, 2012). Figure 13 shows a yearly 
distribution of feature phone and smartphone manufacturing firms. Although 
the number of firms in the overall mobile industry seems to be increasing 
continuously in the figure, if the number of feature phone and smartphone 
manufacturing firms is compared closely, you will find that a shakeout occurred 
in the feature phone industry. Thus, it is necessary to decide whether feature 






Figure 13. The change of the number of Feature phone-production firms 
and Smartphone-production firms 
 
To answer this, it is necessary to review the definitions of the smartphone 
and feature phone. In general, existing mobile phones were called feature 
phones. However, the definition of smartphone has not yet reached a consensus; 
however, according to a study by Becher et al. (2011), a smartphone is defined 
as a mobile phone that contains a Mobile Network Operator Smartcard such as 
USIM or SIM and operating systems that can install third-party software. That 
is, the most important criteria that differentiate a feature phone and smartphone 



















































Feature Phone Smart Phone Feature & Smart Phone
138 
 
products between feature phones and smartphones are considerably different so 
that they are needed to be classified into different product families.  
Furthermore, there are also many differences between them over the 
industry characteristics. Nokia, which had been successful in the feature phone 
market in recent years, did not adapt well in the smartphone industry, and was 
consequently acquired by Microsoft. As such, industry and technological 
characteristics of the feature phone were different from those of the smartphone; 
thus, they were separated for the analysis. It is also true that a feature phone 
industry can be regarded as a new industry even if some firms manufacture 
smartphones and feature phones at the same time, since a large number of firms 
that only entered into the smartphone market are found.  
Furthermore, there are many studies found that analyzed 5.25-inch and 3.5-
inch hard disks differently in the case of the hard disk industry (Khessina & 
Carroll, 2008; Ruebeck, 2005). In this context, it is justified to analyze feature 
phones and smartphones separately.  
Therefore, this paper conducted analysis on feature phones that experienced 
a shakeout. Figure 14 shows entries, exits, and the number of total firms in the 
mobile industry with regard to feature phones. In this figure, division by the 
industry life cycle was also marked. Although few firms entered during the 
shakeout period, some did. This fact proves that the entire industry is not in 
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decline. In developed countries, the majority of people use smartphones, 
whereas feature phone market is still active in some countries. For example, the 
data indicated that firms in India and Eastern European countries are still 
entering into the feature phone market.  
It is also found that the feature phone industry did not reach Phase III yet. 
Although Phase I and Phase II can be distinguished according to the 
classification of Dinlersoz and MacDonald (2009), there was no period when a 
net entry was converged to 0, as shown in Net Entry in Figure 15 for Phase III. 
However, the year of 2013 had net entry 0; thus, since then, it may have reached 




Figure 14. The number of exit and entrance firms in mobile-phone industry 
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Prior to identification of adaptation strategy variables, an indexation should 
be done first through the hedonic price model. The basic statistical data of 
variables used in the hedonic price model is shown in Table 18. As an index to 
represent mobile performance, volume of mobile device, color representation 
ability in screen, the number of sensors such as gravity or temperature sensors, 
battery performance via available standby time, and email usability were 
employed. As was the case in the automobile data, there were highly correlated 
variables found, in which case one or the other were chosen for use. For 
example, screen size or the number of pixels was highly correlated with size of 
mobile phone, so only volume of mobile phone was used as a variable. 
Correlations of the technological characteristic variables finally used are 
presented in Table 19.  
In some feature phones, email can also be used. This feature phone was also 
included in the analysis since it was considered as a superior technology in 
terms of software compared to mobile phones that can send only text messages. 
The analysis results of the hedonic price model are shown in Table 20. R2  that 





Table 18. Descriptive statistics of variables related to technology and 
attributes of mobile 
Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
(1) Dimension density  3416 88544 28392 21145 420736 
(2) Display color depth 3416 865376 3338408 1 26000000 
(3) Number of sensors 3416 0.142 0.470 0 5 
(4) Battery standby time  3416 318.194 205.579 25 2400 




Table 19. Correlation table of variables related to technology and attributes 
of mobile 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(1) Dimension Density 1.000     
(2) Display color depth -0.078* 1.000    
(3) Number of sensors 0.002 0.322* 1.000   
(4) Battery standby time -0.100* 0.051* 0.083* 1.000  





Table 20. Result of hedonic analysis in mobile industry 
 Coefficient Std. Err. 
(1) log Dimension density 0.271*** 0.069 
(2) log Display color depth 0.079*** 0.006 
(3) log Number of sensors 0.335*** 0.039 
(4) log Battery standby time 0.150*** 0.030 
(5) Email dummy 0.368*** 0.031 
Constant 1.709* 0.894 
Year Dummy ( Included ) 
Firm Dummy ( Included ) 
No. of Observations 3220 
Adjusted R2 0.7679 
Notes: The values in parentheses are standard errors; *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
On the basis of technology level of indexed products through the hedonic 
analysis, yearly product distribution was presented. This graph is a frequency 
distribution table of corresponding characteristics over time. This is a plan view 
of a three-dimensional graph (time, frequency, and characteristics values). A 
high peak means that new products with corresponding technology level or 
characteristics are dense. As the graph shows, products are evolved while it 
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forms a mountain-like shape, the ridge of which is a Technological Trajectory; 
the corresponding peak refers to the dominant design. Figure 16 is the 
distribution of variable related to level of technological competence in mobile 
phone industry. And Figure 17 shows a change in distribution over time 
according to mobile phone size. From the left side, distributions of overall 




Figure 16. The distribution of variable related to level of technological 














Figure 17. The distribution of level of size in mobile-phone industry 
 
The variables finally used in the survival analysis are presented in Table 21. 
They consist of size of firm and early entry-related variables derived via 
previous studies including prior experience variables added by the mobile 
analysis, and adaptation strategy variables such as technology level, technology 
increase rate, product dispersion, and product differentiation variables. The 
adaptation strategy variables were derived by converting product-level data into 
firm-level variables using the previously mentioned method. Table 22 shows 
the basic statistics about variables to be used in the analysis and Table 23 
presents the comparison of firm strategic variables by firm characteristics in 
mobile industry, while Table 24 presents their correlations. Figure 18 shows the 
yearly technology levels measured by industry level among the derived 
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variables in the above. The technology increase grew continuously until 
decreasing slightly since 2011. 
 
Table 21. Summary of independents variables in survival analysis of 
mobile firm 
Variables Summary 
_ _First mover dummy  Enter during stage I, then first mover dummy 
equal 1.  
_Size dummy  Market share top 10. 
_De novo dummy  Non pre-entry experience firms have value 1. 
_Technology level  Level of firm’s technology. 
_Technology growth  Increase rate of firm’s technology level. 
_Product dispersion  Dispersion ratio of firm’s products 











Table 22. Descriptive statistics of firm strategic variables in automobile 
industry 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
_Size dummy  359 0.270 0.445 0 1 
_ _First mover dummy  359 0.722 0.449 0 1 
_De novo dummy  359 0.535 0.499 0 1 
_Technology level  359 0.895 0.058 0.695 1.000 
_Technology growth  359 1.590 4.934 -19.126 24.180 
_Product dispersion  359 0.459 0.681 1.428 5.897 






Table 23. The comparison of firm strategic variables by firm characteristics in mobile industry 
Variable  Top 10 Non Top 10 Early Entry Late Entry De novo De alio 





















































Table 24. Correlation table of firm strategic variables in mobile industry 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(1) _Size dummy  1.000       
(2) _ _First mover dummy  0.310* 1.000      
(3) _De novo dummy  -0.169* -0.017 1.000     
(4) _Technology level  -0.042 -0.298* -0.073 1.000    
(5) _Technology growth  -0.028 0.066 -0.042 0.058 1.000   
(6) _Product dispersion  0.248* 0.168* 0.089 -0.299* 0.021 1.000  






Figure 18. The change of level of overall technological competence by the 
year in mobile-phone industry 
 
To interpret the basic statistics with regard to adaptation strategies of 
survived and kicked-out firms, box plots of adaptation strategy distribution of 
survived and kicked-out firms through time are presented in Figure 19 to Figure 
22. In the case of the technology level, a difference of adaptation strategies 
between survived and kicked-out firms was revealed over the whole period. In 
addition, technology level was high in survived firms, so that technology level 
is expected to have a significant effect on survival of firms. However, in the 
case of the technology increase rate, there was a significant difference of 








survived firms was higher than that of kicked-out firms. With respect to product 
dispersion, survived firms showed higher values in the shakeout period. This 
result indicates that firms that selected a strategy aiming to distribute their 
products over a broader range survived. With respect to technology 
differentiation, survived firms took a differentiation strategy in the shakeout 
period, although no significant result was revealed prior to the shakeout. Such 
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 Figure 19. The comparison of technology level of survival and non-
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Figure 20. The comparison of technology growth of survival and non-
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Figure 21. The comparison of level of product diversification of survival 
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Figure 22. The comparison of differentiation level of survival and non-




 Survival analysis result 
In this subsection, empirical analysis result of the Cox proportional hazards 
model is presented to derive adaptation strategies and selection mechanisms in 
the mobile industry centered on the shakeout period, and the results analysis is 
explained. The analysis in the mobile industry consists of four models. The first 
analysis is a basic model, in which the effects of size and entry timing of firms 
derived through previous studies and technology level, technology increase rate, 
product dispersion, and product differentiation suggested as adaptation 
strategies of firms on survival of firms are determined. The regression result is 
presented in Table 25. Results can vary depending on the shakeout time division, 
so we had different time divisions (one and two years before and after the 
selected period). The empirical results of these periods that are not significantly 
different from the regress result contained in this paper are presented in the 
Appendix. Thus, we believe our result is robust.  
The second to fourth analyses are analysis results that used dummy variables 
as interaction terms in order to determine whether adaptation strategy and 
selection mechanism were different according to firm size, entry timing, and 
prior experience before the entry, which were derived through previous studies. 
The regression results of the Cox proportional hazards models for each of them 
are presented in Table 26, Table 27, and Table 28, respectively. However, in the 
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case of the mobile industry, a shakeout is still occurring (or is just completed); 
thus, analysis was only conducted with regard to times prior to and during the 
shakeout period.  
All analyses were done by dividing the data into prior to shakeout, during 
shakeout, and after shakeout. In addition, dependent variables represent a 
hazard ratio in which a negative correlation means a positive effect on survival 
while a positive correlation means a negative effect on survival. First, survival 

















Table 25. The result of survival analysis of firm in mobile industry 
 Pre-Shakeout Shakeout 
_De novo dummy  -1.012 0.161 
 (0.710) (0.808) 
_Size dummy  -34.860*** 0.295 
 (2.347) (0.933) 
_ _First mover dummy  0.960 2.050*** 
 (0.860) (0.735) 
_Technology level  -5.389** -7.535** 
 (2.682) (3.771) 
_Technology growth  -0.015* -0.037 
 (0.008) (0.055) 
_Product dispersion  0.118 -1.100** 
 (0.221) (0.467) 
_Product difference  0.946 -2.702* 
 (1.257) (1.419) 
Log Likelihood -7.319 -18.05 
Observations 117 242 
Notes: The values in parentheses are standard errors; *, ** and *** indicate statistical 









All analyses were done by dividing the data into prior to shakeout, during 
shakeout, and after shakeout. In addition, dependent variables represent a 
hazard ratio in which a negative correlation means a positive effect on survival 
while a positive correlation means a negative effect on survival. First, survival 
analysis results of the basic model are discussed below.  
Adaptation strategies and selection mechanisms prior to the shakeout period 
are discussed. It was found that the large-size firms dummy had a negative 
correlation. This result means that large size firms are advantageous to survival. 
In addition, the coefficient of technology level is -5.389. This means that firms 
with high technology level are advantageous to survival. The coefficient of 
technology increase rate was -0.015. That is, advantages of technology increase 
rate were discovered at the early stage of the industry. This period is a time in 
which consumers are not satisfied with the quality of product in terms of 
technology level. Accordingly, survival probability increases by increasing 
technology increase rate in order to meet the requirement of consumers in terms 
of technology level (Agarwal & Bayus, 2002).  
At the time of shakeout, a coefficient of early entry firm dummy was 2.050, 
which showed a positive correlation. Accordingly, it was found rather that early 
entry firms were disadvantageous to survival. This result is different from that 
of previous studies. This result was obtained because the first mover advantage 
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through information advantage, as in the early 1900s, cannot be enjoyed 
(Agarwal & Gort, 2001). However, the coefficient of technology level showed 
-7.535. This result means that firms with high technology have high survival 
probability. Furthermore, it was revealed that selling a variety of ranges in 
products was also advantageous to survival. In addition, the coefficient of 
product differentiation was -2.702. This means that a differentiation strategy 
increased survival probability of firms. In summary, concerning product 
dispersion and differentiation variables, product dispersion broadly by finding 
a niche area in the market will be a strategy that increases survival probability 
in the shakeout period. The de novo firm dummy had no significant value.  
Next, it will be discussed how these adaptation strategies and survival 
mechanisms change depending on the size of firms, entry timing, and prior 
experiences. The survival analysis results according to the size of firm are 
shown in Table 26, while the survival analysis results according to the entry 
timing are shown in Table 27 and survival analysis results according to prior 







Table 26. The comparison of survival analyses by time of entry in mobile 
industry 
 Pre-Shakeout Shakeout 
_De novo dummy  -0.694 1.524* 
 (0.644) (0.856) 
_Size dummy  -2.484* -1.149 
 (1.444) (2.827) 
_ _First mover dummy  1.063** 4.114** 
 (0.498) (1.605) 
_Technology level  -1.156* -8.983*** 
 (0.594) (3.168) 
Size × _Technology level  -0.068** -0.882** 
 (0.031) (0.362) 
_Technology growth  -0.025*** -0.053*** 
 (0.007) (0.018) 
Size × _Technology growth  -0.004 -0.297*** 
 (0.009) (0.075) 
_Product dispersion  -0.134 -5.727*** 
 (0.102) (1.993) 
Size × _Product dispersion  0.145 5.026*** 
 (0.113) (1.550) 
_Product difference  -0.717** -4.774*** 
 (0.297) (1.276) 
Size × _Product difference  0.927** 6.878 
 (0.393) (6.154) 
Log Likelihood -24.03 -15.01 
Observations 117 242 
 Notes: The values in parentheses are standard errors; *, ** and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 27. The comparison of survival analyses by time of entry to the 
market in mobile industry 
 Pre-Shakeout Shakeout 
_De novo dummy  0.134 -0.234 
 (0.845) (0.716) 
_Size dummy  -0.274 -0.370 
 (1.180) (1.251) 
_ _First mover dummy  109.517*** 6.770*** 
 (41.545) (2.461) 
_Technology level  -9.774** -8.454*** 
 (3.970) (2.594) 
First × _Technology level  -1.910*** -0.469** 
 (0.680) (0.217) 
_Technology growth  -0.121* -0.029** 
 (0.062) (0.014) 
First × _Technology growth  0.110* -0.087* 
 (0.060) (0.046) 
_Product dispersion  1.308*** -47.421** 
 (0.507) (21.019) 
First × _Product dispersion  -1.374*** 46.021** 
 (0.525) (20.561) 
_Product difference  -8.426*** -4.655*** 
 (2.550) (1.359) 
First × _Product difference  7.912*** -0.154 
 (2.370) (1.764) 
Log Likelihood -19.78 -15.52 
Observations 117 242 
Notes: The values in parentheses are standard errors; *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 28. The comparison of survival analyses by time of entry to the 
market in mobile industry 
 Pre-Shakeout Shakeout 
_De novo dummy  9.256** -0.076 
 (3.879) (3.453) 
_Size dummy  -0.745 -1.750* 
 (1.245) (1.018) 
_ _First mover dummy  0.264 2.619*** 
 (0.510) (0.929) 
_Technology level  0.031 -3.827 
 (0.696) (3.226) 
De novo × _Technology level  -0.183** -0.939** 
 (0.072) (0.454) 
_Technology growth  0.007 -0.062*** 
 (0.006) (0.023) 
De novo × _Technology growth  -0.027** 0.023 
 (0.011) (0.023) 
_Product dispersion  -0.242* 0.918 
 (0.125) (1.512) 
De novo × _Product dispersion  -0.484 -3.707*** 
 (0.415) (1.409) 
_Product difference  -0.933*** -15.412** 
 (0.316) (7.486) 
De novo × _Product difference  0.420 12.698* 
 (0.397) (6.539) 
Log Likelihood -21.08 -16.97 
Observations 117 242 
Notes: The values in parentheses are standard errors; *, ** and *** indicate statistical 




Table 29. The moderating effect of firm characteristics on survival analysis in mobile industry 
 Moderating effect of large firms Moderating effect of early entry Moderating effect of De novo 
 Pre-Shakeout Shakeout Pre-Shakeout Shakeout Pre-Shakeout Shakeout 
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The method of interpretation of interaction terms is as follows: An example 
of how to interpret the technology level variable that did not multiply 
interaction term in Equation (4.5) and its coefficient value, 
1 _Technology levelγ × , as well as technology level variable that used a size 
dummy as interaction term and its coefficient value, 
2 _ _Technology level Size dummyγ × × , is given here. 1γ  is a derived 
value regardless of size of firms. This is because all data in large-sized and 
small and medium-sized firms are used to estimate 1γ . However, in the case of
2γ , only when a size dummy is 1 is it included in the estimation equation. 
Therefore, 2γ refers to a marginal effect of a large-size firm. In this case, care 
should be taken not to interpret 1γ  as an effect of small and medium sized 
firms. Therefore, the reason for the estimation of models with the interaction 
term is to determine whether the effect of adaptation strategies can differ 
depending on size or entry timing of firms.  
Table 29 presents the differentiated effect of variables that used interaction 
terms. The analysis results showed that variables that do not use interaction 
terms in each model did not show any contradictory result against the basic 
model presented in Table 25, while no strategies were changed by size of firm 
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or entry timing of firm. Therefore, the same result was derived with that shown 
in Table 25. However, a differentiated marginal effect of strategy variables is 
the same as shown in Table 29. That is, although adaptation strategies that are 
advantageous to survival are differ by time on the basis of shakeout, the 
adaptation strategies are not different by size or entry timing. Only marginal 
effect was different. This fact proves that the derived result from Table 25 is a 
stable result.   
 
5.5  Sub-conclusion 
 
To identify adaptation strategies and selection mechanism according to 
stages in industry evolution, particularly at the time of shakeout, empirical 
analysis was conducted with respect to the mobile industry. Using the product 
data in the mobile industry, adaptation strategy variables such as technology 
level, technology increase rate, product dispersion, and product differentiation 
of firms were derived. In addition, major selection factors such as a size of firm, 
entry timing of firm, and prior experience of firm were derived through the 
identification of formalized facts from previous studies.  
Furthermore, survival analysis was conducted as per stage of industry 
evolution using three variables derived from previous studies and four 
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adaptation strategy variables via product analysis. Additionally, analysis that 
uses each dummy variable as interaction terms was also conducted to determine 
whether such an adaptation strategy is different or their effect is different 
depending on a size of firm, entry timing of firm, and prior experience of firm.  
Note that since the characteristics of feature phone and smartphone are 
different from each other, this study only targeted feature phones for analysis. 
In addition, since characteristics of a time after shakeout in the mobile industry 
cannot be found, only periods of shakeout and prior to shakeout are analyzed. 
The main results were as follows.   
The analysis result of the basic model showed that only size of firm was 
advantageous to survival at a time prior to shakeout, while the other two 
variables (entry timing and prior experiences of firm) did not have significant 
results. Such a result is in consistent with a claim by Agarwal & Gort (2001) 
and Nelson (1995) saying that recent industry cannot enjoy information 
advantage, thereby negating the effect. On the other hand, in the case of the 
mobile industry, there are companies that provide core technologies in mobile 
devices. For example, 90% of CDMA products use chips from Qualcomm. It 
was also shown that most parts in mobile devices are not developed by the firms 
but are purchased from other firms. Therefore, latecomers in the mobile 
industry had no advantage that early entry firms normally have because there 
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is an environment that can adopt core technologies through the purchase of a 
number of parts, including chips, that already existed in the industry, and there 
is an effect of specialization of part adoption. In addition, the barrier to entry 
became lower for computer or notebook industries as well because there are 
firms that are specialized in manufacturing core parts, such as CPUs, memory, 
and hard disks, and firms can easily purchase them. Due to such effect, it is 
expected that the electronics industry may have no advantage for early entry 
firms in most cases. 
Nonetheless, regardless of industry development stages, survival probability 
of firms increased in all stages if technology level was high. This is because the 
mobile industry is technology-oriented. In addition, prior to shakeout, if a 
technology increase rate was high, it was conducive to survival of firms. This 
conclusion was the same as in the automobile industry, in which no product 
could meet the consumers’ requirements prior to shakeout (Agarwal & Bayus, 
2002), thereby requiring a fast catch-up.  
During the shakeout period, adaptation strategies that affect survival 
positively are high technology level, product dispersion, and product 
differentiation strategy. That is, this result means that survival of generalist 
firms is high in this period. This characteristic is only shown in the mobile 
industry (not the automobile industry). In the automobile industry, considerable 
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R&D cost is needed to release a variety of products, whereas the mobile 
industry requires relatively low costs for product dispersion.  
With respect to the product differentiation strategy, the automobile industry 
had the same result. For the same reason, because this period is a time that 
selection mechanism is working, by which many firms are kicked out, firms 
should pursue differentiation through the product differentiation strategy to 
become one of the few survivors. As an alternative explanation, economies of 
scale should be established to compete with other firms through price 
competition in order to survive in the industry by following firms that 
developed the dominant design; thus, firms that are not able to achieve economy 









6.1  Summary of this study 
 Adaptation strategy and selection mechanism at the 
shakeout period 
In this study, formalized facts were derived by summarizing previous study 
results related to survival of firms at the shakeout period over the industry life 
cycle. Through the previous study results, it was found that size of firm, entry 
timing of firm to the industry, prior experiences of related industry by firms, 
and innovation of firms were main study areas.  
With respect to a size of firm, the following formalized fact was derived 
from most study results: large-size firms that achieved economy of scale had 
survival advantages. On the other hand, other study results claimed that 
disadvantages due to size will disappear through the pioneer of niche markets 
after an industry is stabilized.   
With respect to entry timing to industry, most studies discussed whether the 
first mover advantage was present or not. The majority of early study results 
acknowledged that early entry firms had advantages over latecomers, but since 
then some studies claimed that this is not so in some cases. In particular, many 
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studies reported their results depending on occurrence time of the dominant 
design, where early entry firms had an advantage initially before the dominant 
design was established, but latecomers had an advantage after the dominant 
design was established because knowledge available was not useful anymore. 
In addition, some studies claimed that the first mover advantage of knowledge 
disappeared in recent industries, so that no more advantage for early entry firms 
could be discovered.  
In relation to prior experiences before the entry, most studies acknowledged 
that de alio firms introduced from other related industries had a survival 
advantage. However, some studies claimed that if de novo firms survive in the 
shakeout period because de alio firms had high opportunity cost due to their 
allowable investment on other industries, then the survival probability of de 
novo firms will increase.  
In addition, with respect to innovation of firms, all studies concluded that 
innovative firms had a high survival probability.  
The following conclusions were made accordingly. Most previous studies 
presented selection mechanisms according to a size of firms, entry timing of 
firms, and prior experiences of firms. However, such factors ae easily changed 
by firms. Although they can give some implications regarding selection 
mechanism of a market, no significant implications for firms are given.  
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It was also found that few studies on early stage of industry were conducted 
by dividing stages of industry evolution. As can be seen in the formalized fact 
explained in the above, there is a severe change in environment in early days of 
industry; thus, such studies are highly important.  
Therefore, it is necessary to overcome the limitation of previous studies by 
taking the adaptation efforts of firms into consideration along with the three 
selection factors derived in the above while performing empirical analysis in 
this study. In addition, this study aimed to analyze selection mechanisms and 
adaptation strategies of firms that change with differentiating evolutionary 
stages of industry to consider industry dynamics.  
   
 Adaptation strategies and selection mechanism in the 
US automobile industry 
This chapter showed how adaptation strategies and selection mechanism 
were changed depending on the evolutionary process on the basis of shakeout 
using the product data in the US automobile industry.  
There are selection and adaptation laws in the survival law in evolutionary 
economics. Among them, few studies have been conducted on adaptation 
strategies. Thus, this study aimed to overcome this limitation using product 
level data to consider the adaptation strategies. The adaptation strategies 
173 
 
derived from the product level data were divided into four variables: technology 
level, technology increase rate, product dispersion, and product differentiation. 
Selection factors derived from previous studies were also considered to conduct 
survival analysis. The model used in the analysis was the Cox proportional 
hazards model, and the main results are as follow. 
It was revealed that a large-size firm dummy and early entry dummy 
increased survival probability in all stages. This result is consistent with the 
formalized fact derived in the previous chapter. In addition, it was found that 
technology increase rate increased survival probability prior to the shakeout 
period. This is because technology level of products did not satisfy the 
consumers’ requirement; thus, fast technology improvement rate influenced 
survival positively.  
In addition, a product differentiation strategy had a positive effect on 
survival only in the shakeout period, whereas it had a negative effect in other 
periods. Therefore, it can be concluded that product differentiation was the best 
strategy at the shakeout period, while product imitation strategy was the best 
adaptation strategy at other periods. The reason for the positive effect of the 
imitation strategy on survival of firms prior to the shakeout in relation to the 
dominant design can be interpreted as meaning that firms learn the consumers’ 
response through products of other firms and need to manufacture better selling 
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products. That is, it is interpreted that the dominant design can be established 
through firms’ iterative imitation of one another. In other words, this result is 
interpreted as meaning that the dominant design was not given from the outside 
but is derived through coordination between firms and consumers.   
On the other hand, it is highly interesting to see that product differentiation 
should be attempted at the shakeout period. If it is helpful to follow the 
dominant design for survival, firms should release similar products. However, 
our result showed the opposite. That is, if firms follow the already-established 
dominant design, they need to win the price competition if they want to survive. 
However, if they do not follow this strategy, they cannot escape from the price 
competition and are kicked out without economies of scale. If interpreted 
differently, a shakeout period is a time in which most industries experienced 
exits of firms, which is different from general selection mechanisms. Therefore, 
it can be interpreted that a unique product should be developed through product 
differentiation to secure survival during a shakeout period.  
 
 Adaptation strategy and selection mechanism in the 
mobile industry 
As in the previous chapter, survival analysis was conducted using adaptation 
strategy variables and selection factor variables.  
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The analysis result of the basic model showed that only size of firm was 
advantageous to survival at the time prior to shakeout, while the other two 
variables (entry timing and prior experiences of firm) did not show significant 
results. This result is inconsistent with a claim by Agarwal & Gort (2001) and 
Nelson (1995) that recent industry cannot enjoy information advantage, thereby 
negating the effect.  
Nonetheless, regardless of industry development stages, survival probability 
of firms increased in all stages if technology level was high. This is because the 
mobile industry is technology-oriented. In addition, prior to shakeout, if 
technology increase rate was high, it was conducive to survival of firms. This 
conclusion was the same as in the automobile industry, in which no product 
could meet the consumer’s requirement prior to shakeout, thereby requiring a 
fast catch-up.  
During the shakeout period, adaptation strategies that affect survival 
positively are high technology level, product dispersion, and product 
differentiation strategy. That is, this result means that survival of generalist 
firms is high in this period. This characteristic is only shown in the mobile 
industry, whereas the automobile industry did not show this characteristic. In 
the automobile industry, considerable R&D cost is needed to release a variety 
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of products, whereas the mobile industry requires relatively little cost for 
product dispersion.  
With respect to the product differentiation strategy, the automobile industry 
had the same result. For the same reason, because this period is a time that 
selection mechanism is working, by which many firms are kicked out, firms 
should pursue a product differentiation strategy to become one of the few 
survivors. As an alternative explanation, economy of scale should be 
established to compete with other firms through price competition in order to 
survive in the industry by following firms that developed the dominant design 
so that firms that are not able to achieve economies of scale should pursue the 












Table 30. The comparison between survival analyses in mobile and automobile industry 
 Automobile Mobile Automobile Mobile Automobile 
 Pre-Shakeout Period Shakeout Period Post-Shakeout Period 
Firm Size Positive Positive Positive  Positive 
Early Entry Positive  Positive Negative Positive 
Technology Level  Positive  Positive  
Technology Growth Positive Positive    
Product Diversity    Positive  
Product Difference Negative  Positive Positive Negative 
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6.2  Implications 
 
Although an adaptation strategy that increases survival probability of firms 
is different depending on industry and time, it is also true that there are some 
common results. The common adaptation strategies are that prior to a shakeout, 
a technology increase rate has a positive effect on survival of a firm, while 
product differentiation increases survival probability at the time of shakeout. 
Prior to a shakeout, it is a time to race with other firms not to be left behind. 
This period is one in which a technology increase rate is rapid as the number of 
firms increases. Therefore, firms that cannot keep pace with this fast increase 
rate will be kicked out of the industry. 
In addition, a shakeout is a time when a big destructive wave is surging. At 
this period, most firms are kicked out. Therefore, to survive this period, firms 
should use an adaptation strategy to survive price competition and achieve 
economies of scale as they follow the dominant design, as proposed by previous 
studies, or increase survival possibility through product differentiation. 
Therefore, attempting product differentiation, which is different from what 
other firms do during the shakeout period (in which most firms are kicked out), 




6.3  Contribution and limitation 
 
This paper aims to reinterpret the industry development process from the 
evolutionary economics viewpoint. The two most significant differences 
between the neoclassical economics and evolutionary economics are whether 
difference of industry is considered and whether dynamics over time is 
considered. Although previous studies attempted interpretation of the industry 
development process in terms of evolutionary economics viewpoints, they did 
not reflect the differentiation of evolutionary economics sufficiently. In 
particular, few studies have been done to reflect both such differences and 
dynamics in empirical studies. However, this paper takes dynamics over time 
into consideration and reflects differences of industry by employing 
differentiated product-level data from previous studies. 
In addition, this paper applied the discussion of selection and adaptation in 
evolutionary economics into the discussion of industry development for the first 
time and determined whether such discussion can provide an effective study 
framework. In this regard, a study framework of selection and adaptation was 
applied to automobile and mobile industries to conduct empirical analysis. As 
a result, we verified that our study framework, considering selection and 
adaptation in balance, can be a good alternative to explain the industry 
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evolution process as well as verifying the dynamics of selection mechanism and 
adaptation strategy.  
There are many reasons why previous studies did not consider adaptation 
concepts actively. For example, data acquisition was not easy due to the study 
characteristic in relation to industry evolution concerning more venerable 
industries, survey analysis is not applicable, and adaptation efforts of firms are 
difficult to be quantified despite use of financial data. In particular, an 
innovation strategy uses innovation variables such as R&D expense and the 
number of patents produced; however, these variables are limited to see a 
variety of aspects of innovation strategy. Due to such limitations, previous 
studies concentrated on characteristics of firms that are not changeable, such as 
a size of firm or entry timing, rather than adaptation efforts of firms. That is, 
the main discussion of previous studies was focused on selection rather than 
adaptation.  
To overcome this limitation, this study attempted analysis using nearly all 
product data that was never employed before in related previous studies. 
Studies in the field of business administration have used a method of firm-level 
discussion by analyzing products released by firms several times. However, the 
focus of business administration is on firms, so those studies are regarded as 
case studies only. However, this study included all products that existed in each 
181 
 
industry of interest; thus, this study can draw not only firm-level discussion but 
also industry-level discussion. Therefore, from the methodological point of 
views, this study is the first to apply the method to an entire industry and also 
is a differentiated study applied over a long-term analysis period. In addition, 
this study contributed to the interdisciplinary study of product analysis, which 
was only dealt with in business administration or engineering studies. For 
example, a strategy that increases size of firms and achieving economies of 
scale during the shakeout period, according to the identified implications from 
existing studies, and survives in subsequent price competition may not be an 
option for every firm. However, the strategy derived in this study is innovation 
and product strategies, which can be applicable and executable for all firms. 
That is, this study contributed to application of a new analysis framework, 
as with selection and adaptation in evolutionary economics, to related studies 
from a theoretical viewpoint. It also contributed to connection into industry-
level discussion utilizing product data from a methodological viewpoint. 
Through such a differentiated theoretical framework and methodology, an 
internal aspect of industry evolution, which could not have been disclosed up 
until now, was observed; thereby, strategic implications that are applicable to 
firms were presented in this study.  
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This study has a limitation of data acquisition since it analyzed old industries. 
For example, some firms with experiences in the bicycle or horse wagon 
industry entered into the automobile industry; however, this could not be 
reflected in this study due to data limitation.  
In addition, since this study derived adaptation strategies through product 
analysis, this method cannot be applied to petrochemical or services industry in 
which the concept of product is ambiguous.  
As a last limitation, this paper made an effort to derive generalized results 
as much as possible by intentionally selecting industries of considerably 
different characteristics. However, it is not certain yet that adaptation strategies 
derived in this study are also applicable to other industries. Few empirical 
studies have yet been conducted in consideration of adaptation strategies of 
firms. Therefore, it is expected that more generalized results will be derived 








Aaker, D. A., & Day, G. S. (1986). The perils of high-growth markets. 
Strategic Management Journal, 7(5), 409-421.  
Abernathy, W. J. (1978). Patterns of industrial innovation. Technology Review, 
80(7), 40-47.  
Abernathy, W. J., & Utterback, J. M. (1978). Patterns of industrial innovation. 
Technology Review, 80(7), 40-47. 
Agarwal, R. (1996). Technological activity and survival of firms. Economics 
Letters, 52(1), 101-108.  
Agarwal, R. (1997). Survival of firms over the product life cycle. Southern 
Economic Journal, 63(3) 571-584.  
Agarwal, R. (1998). Evolutionary trends of industry variables. International 
Journal of Industrial Organization, 16(4), 511-525.  
Agarwal, R., & Audretsch, D. B. (2001). Does entry size matter? The impact 
of the life cycle and technology on firm survival. The Journal of 
Industrial Economics, 49(1), 21-43.  
184 
 
Agarwal, R., & Bayus, B. L. (2002). The market evolution and sales takeoff 
of product innovations. Management Science, 48(8), 1024-1041.  
Agarwal, R., Echambadi, R., Franco, A. M., & Sarkar, M. (2004). Knowledge 
transfer through inheritance: Spin-out generation, development, and 
survival. Academy of Management Journal, 47(4), 501-522.  
Agarwal, R., & Gort, M. (1996). The evolution of markets and entry, exit and 
survival of firms. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 78(3), 489-
498.  
Agarwal, R., & Gort, M. (2001). First‐Mover Advantage and the Speed of 
Competitive Entry, 1887–1986. Journal of Law and Economics, 44(1), 
161-177.  
Anderson, P., & Tushman, M. L. (1990). Technological discontinuities and 
dominant designs: A cyclical model of technological change. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 35(4), 604-633.  
Audretsch, D. B. (1991). New-firm survival and the technological regime. The 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 73(3), 441-450.  
Audretsch, D. B. (1995a). Innovation, growth and survival. International 
Journal of Industrial Organization, 13(4), 441-457.  
185 
 
Audretsch, D. B. (1995b). The propensity to exit and innovation. Review of 
Industrial Organization, 10(5), 589-605.  
Audretsch, D. B., & Mahmood, T. (1995). New firm survival: new results 
using a hazard function. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 77(1), 
97-103.  
Baldwin, J. R., & Gorecki, P. (1998). The dynamics of industrial competition: 
A North American perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Baldwin, J. R., & Rafiquzzaman, M. (1995). Selection versus evolutionary 
adaptation: Learning and post-entry performance. International Journal 
of Industrial Organization, 13(4), 501-522.  
Barnett, W. P., & Hansen, M. T. (1996). The red queen in organizational 
evolution. Strategic Management Journal, 17(S1), 139-157.  
Baron, J. N., Burton, M. D., & Hannan, M. T. (1999). Engineering 
bureaucracy: The genesis of formal policies, positions, and structures in 
high-technology firms. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 
15(1), 1-41.  
186 
 
Bartelsman, E., Scarpetta, S., & Schivardi, F. (2005). Comparative analysis of 
firm demographics and survival: evidence from micro-level sources in 
OECD countries. Industrial and Corporate Change, 14(3), 365-391.  
Baumol, W. J. (1982). Contestable markets: an uprising in the theory of 
industry structure. American Economic Review, 72(1), 1-15.  
Bayus, B. L. (1998). An analysis of product lifetimes in a technologically 
dynamic industry. Management Science, 44(6), 763-775.  
Bayus, B. L., & Agarwal, R. (2007). The role of pre-entry experience, entry 
timing, and product technology strategies in explaining firm survival. 
Management Science, 53(12), 1887-1902.  
Bergek, A., Tell, F., Berggren, C., & Watson, J. (2008). Technological 
capabilities and late shakeouts: industrial dynamics in the advanced gas 
turbine industry, 1987–2002. Industrial and Corporate Change, 17(2), 
335-392.  
Boeker, W. (1989). Strategic change: The effects of founding and history. 
Academy of Management Journal, 32(3), 489-515.  
187 
 
Bonaccorsi, A., & Giuri, P. (2000). When shakeout doesn’t occur: the 
evolution of the turboprop engine industry. Research Policy, 29(7), 847-
870.  
Bonaccorsi, A., & Giuri, P. (2001). The long-term evolution of vertically-
related industries. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 
19(7), 1053-1083.  
Bonanno, G. (1987). Location choice, product proliferation and entry 
deterrence. The Review of Economic Studies, 54(1), 37-45.  
Buenstorf, G. (2007). Evolution on the shoulders of giants: entrepreneurship 
and firm survival in the German laser industry. Review of Industrial 
Organization, 30(3), 179-202.  
Byeon, H (2004). Studies on the technology innovation system of the Korean 
automobile industry with hedonic analysis (Master's dissertation), Seoul 
National Univ., Seoul. (In Korean) 
Cabral, L. (2012). Technology uncertainty, sunk costs, and industry shakeout. 
Industrial and Corporate Change, 21(3), 539-552.  
Cantner, U., Dreßler, K., & Krüger, J. J. (2006). Firm survival in the German 
automobile industry. Empirica, 33(1), 49-60.  
188 
 
Carroll, G. R., Bigelow, L. S., Seidel, M. D. L., & Tsai, L. B. (1996). The 
fates of de novo and de alio producers in the American automobile 
industry 1885–1981. Strategic Management Journal, 17(S1), 117-137.  
Carroll, G. R., & Hannan, M. T. (2000). The demography of corporations and 
industries. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Carroll, G. R., Khessina, O. M., & McKendrick, D. G. (2010). The social 
lives of products: Analyzing product demography for management theory 
and practice. The Academy of Management Annals, 4(1), 157-203.  
Caves, R. E., & Porter, M. E. (1977). From entry barriers to mobility barriers: 
Conjectural decisions and contrived deterrence to new competition. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 91(2), 241-261.  
Cefis, E., & Marsili, O. (2006). Survivor: The role of innovation in firms’ 
survival. Research Policy, 35(5), 626-641.  
Choi, H. (2010). Exploring the development of emerging sectors from the 
perspective of innovation systems : the case of the hydrogen energy and 




Choi, K. (2014). Nature versus nurture in resources and capabilities on the 
firm growth (Doctoral dissertation), Seoul National Univ., Seoul.  
Christensen, C. M., Suárez, F. F., & Utterback, J. M. (1998). Strategies for 
survival in fast-changing industries. Management Science, 44(12-2), 
S207-S220.  
Coad, A., & Rao, R. (2008). Innovation and firm growth in high-tech sectors: 
A quantile regression approach. Research Policy, 37(4), 633-648.  
Combris, P., Lecocq, S., & Visser, M. (1997). Estimation of a hedonic price 
equation for Bordeaux wine: Does quality matter? The Economic 
Journal, 107(441), 390-402.  
Cox, D. R. (1972). Regression models and life tables. Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society. Series B, 34(2), 187-220.  
Day, G. S., Fein, A. J., & Ruppersberger, G. (2003). Shakeouts in digital 
markets: Lessons from B2B exchanges. California Management Review, 
45(2), 131-150  




Dinlersoz, E. M., & MacDonald, G. (2009). The industry life-cycle of the size 
distribution of firms. Review of Economic Dynamics, 12(4), 648-667.  
Dosi, G. (1982). Technological paradigms and technological trajectories: a 
suggested interpretation of the determinants and directions of technical 
change. Research Policy, 11(3), 147-162.  
Douglas, G. W., & Miller, J. C. (1974). Quality competition, industry 
equilibrium, and efficiency in the price-constrained airline market. 
American Economic Review, 64(4), 657-669.  
Dowell, G., & Swaminathan, A. (2006). Entry timing, exploration, and firm 
survival in the early US bicycle industry. Strategic Management Journal, 
27(12), 1159-1182.  
Dunne, T., Roberts, M. J., & Samuelson, L. (1988). Patterns of firm entry and 
exit in US manufacturing industries. The RAND Journal of Economics, 
19(4), 495-515.  
Feenstra, R. C., & Levinsohn, J. A. (1995). Estimating markups and market 
conduct with multidimensional product attributes. The Review of 
Economic Studies, 62(1), 19-52.  
191 
 
Filson, D. (2001). The nature and effects of technological change over the 
industry life cycle. Review of Economic Dynamics, 4(2), 460-494.  
Fontana, R., & Nesta, L. (2009). Product innovation and survival in a high-
tech industry. Review of Industrial Organization, 34(4), 287-306.  
Geroski, P. A. (1995). What do we know about entry? International Journal of 
Industrial Organization, 13(4), 421-440.  
Gort, M., & Klepper, S. (1982). Time paths in the diffusion of product 
innovations. The Economic Journal, 92(367), 630-653.  
Greenstein, S. M., & Wade, J. B. (1998). The product life cycle in the 
commercial mainframe computer market, 1968-1982. The RAND Journal 
of Economics, 29(4), 772-789.  
Han, J. (2009). Industrial dynamics in the perspectives of technological 
regime, industry life cycle and resource-based view : micro-evidences 
from Korean manufacturing (Doctoral dissertation), Seoul National 
Univ., Seoul. 
Haupt, R., Kloyer, M., & Lange, M. (2007). Patent indicators for the 
technology life cycle development. Research Policy, 36(3), 387-398.  
192 
 
Henderson, R. M., & Clark, K. B. (1990). Architectural innovation: the 
reconfiguration of existing product technologies and the failure of 
established firms. Administrative Science Quarterly, 35(1), 9-30.  
Holbrook, D., Cohen, W. M., Hounshell, D. A., & Klepper, S. (2000). The 
nature, sources, and consequences of firm differences in the early history 
of the semiconductor industry. Strategic Management Journal, 21(10-
11), 1017-1041.  
Horvath, M., Schivardi, F., & Woywode, M. (2001). On industry life-cycles: 
delay, entry, and shakeout in beer brewing. International Journal of 
Industrial Organization, 19(7), 1023-1052.  
Jeong, S. (2014). Change of dominant design by technological paradigm shift 
& success factors of followers’ catching-up (Doctoral dissertation), Seoul 
National Univ., Seoul. 
Jovanovic, B. (1982). Selection and the evolution of industry. Econometrica, 
50(3), 649-670.  
Jovanovic, B., & MacDonald, G. (1994). The life-cycle of a competitive 
industry. Journal of Political Economy, 102(2), 322-347.  
193 
 
Khessina, O. M., & Carroll, G. R. (2008). Product demography of de novo 
and de alio firms in the optical disk drive industry, 1983–1999. 
Organization Science, 19(1), 25-38.  
Klepper, S. (1996). Entry, exit, growth, and innovation over the product life 
cycle. The American Economic Review, 86(3), 562-583.  
Klepper, S. (2002a). The capabilities of new firms and the evolution of the US 
automobile industry. Industrial and Corporate Change, 11(4), 645-666.  
Klepper, S. (2002b). Firm survival and the evolution of oligopoly. The RAND 
Journal of Economics, 33(1), 37-61.  
Klepper, S., & Graddy, E. (1990). The evolution of new industries and the 
determinants of market structure. The RAND Journal of Economics, 
33(1), 27-44.  
Klepper, S., & Miller, J. H. (1995). Entry, exit, and shakeouts in the United 
States in new manufactured products. International Journal of Industrial 
Organization, 13(4), 567-591.  
Klepper, S., & Simons, K. L. (2000). Dominance by birthright: entry of prior 
radio producers and competitive ramifications in the US television 
receiver industry. Strategic Management Journal, 21(10-11), 997-1016.  
194 
 
Klepper, S., & Simons, K. L. (2005). Industry shakeouts and technological 
change. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 23(1), 23-43.  
Klepper, S., & Thompson, P. (2006). Submarkets and the evolution of market 
structure. The RAND Journal of Economics, 37(4), 861-886.  
Lambkin, M. (1988). Order of entry and performance in new markets. 
Strategic Management Journal, 9(S1), 127-140.  
Lawless, M. W., & Anderson, P. C. (1996). Generational technological 
change: Effects of innovation and local rivalry on performance. Academy 
of Management Journal, 39(5), 1185-1217.  
Lieberman, M. B., & Montgomery, D. B. (1988). First‐mover advantages. 
Strategic Management Journal, 9(S1), 41-58.  
Mahmood, T. (1992). Does the hazard rate for new plants vary between low-
and high-tech industries? Small Business Economics, 4(3), 201-209.  
Malerba, F., & Orsenigo, L. (1996). The dynamics and evolution of industries. 
Industrial and Corporate Change, 5(1), 51-87.  




Mata, J., & Portugal, P. (1994). Life duration of new firms. Journal of 
Industrial Economics, 42(3), 227-245.  
Mata, J., Portugal, P., & Guimaraes, P. (1995). The survival of new plants: 
Start-up conditions and post-entry evolution. International Journal of 
Industrial Organization, 13(4), 459-481.  
Meeus, M. T., & Oerlemans, L. A. (2000). Firm behaviour and innovative 
performance: An empirical exploration of the selection–adaptation 
debate. Research Policy, 29(1), 41-58.  
Murmann, J. P., & Frenken, K. (2006). Toward a systematic framework for 
research on dominant designs, technological innovations, and industrial 
change. Research Policy, 35(7), 925-952.  
Na, J. (2013). Analysis of heterogeneity on the firm size and innovation 
distribution in the econophysics perspective (Doctoral dissertation), 
Seoul National Univ., Seoul. (In Korean) 
Nelson, R. R. (1995). Co–evolution of industry structure, technology and 
supporting institutions, and the making of comparative advantage. 
International Journal of the Economics of Business, 2(2), 171-184.  
196 
 
Nelson, R. R., & Winter, S. G. (1977). In search of useful theory of 
innovation. Research Policy, 6(1), 36-76.  
Nelson, R. R., & Winter, S. G. (1982). An evolutionary theory of economic 
change. Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press.  
Newman, H. H. (1978). Strategic groups and the structure-performance 
relationship. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 60(3), 417-427.  
O'Hearn, M. (2007). Henry Ford and the Model T. Mankato: Capstone press. 
Olleros, F.-J. (1986). Emerging industries and the burnout of pioneers. 
Journal of Product Innovation Management, 3(1), 5-18.  
Pakes, A., & Ericson, R. (1998). Empirical implications of alternative models 
of firm dynamics. Journal of Economic Theory, 79(1), 1-45.  
Peiler, F. (2004). Cars of the Classic '30s: A Decade of Elegant Design. 
Lincolnwood: Publications International, Inc. 
Persson, H. (2004). The survival and growth of new establishments in 
Sweden, 1987-1995. Small Business Economics, 23(5), 423-440.  
197 
 
Phillips, B. D., & Kirchhoff, B. A. (1989). Formation, growth and survival; 
small firm dynamics in the US economy. Small Business Economics, 
1(1), 65-74.  
Porter, M. E. (1979). How competitive forces shape strategy. Cambridge: 
Harvard Business Press. 
Rao, H. (1994). The social construction of reputation: Certification contests, 
legitimation, and the survival of organizations in the American 
automobile industry: 1895–1912. Strategic Management Journal, 15(S1), 
29-44.  
Robinson, W. T., Fornell, C., & Sullivan, M. (1992). Are market pioneers 
intrinsically stronger than later entrants? Strategic Management Journal, 
13(8), 609-624.  
Rosen, S. (1974). Hedonic prices and implicit markets: Product differentiation 
in pure competition. The Journal of Political Economy, 82(1), 34-55.  
Rothaermel, F. T., & Hill, C. W. (2005). Technological discontinuities and 
complementary assets: A longitudinal study of industry and firm 
performance. Organization Science, 16(1), 52-70.  
198 
 
Ruebeck, C. S. (2005). Model exit in a vertically differentiated market: 
Interfirm competition versus intrafirm cannibalization in the computer 
hard disk drive industry. Review of Industrial Organization, 26(1), 27-59.  
Sørensen, J. B., & Stuart, T. E. (2000). Aging, obsolescence, and 
organizational innovation. Administrative Science Quarterly, 45(1), 81-
112.  
Schmalensee, R. (1978). Entry deterrence in the ready-to-eat breakfast cereal 
industry. The Bell Journal of Economics, 9(2), 305-327.  
Schumpeter, J. A. (1939). Business cycles (Vol. 1). Cambridge: Cambridge 
Univ Press. 
Shamsie, J., Phelps, C., & Kuperman, J. (2004). Better late than never: a study 
of late entrants in household electrical equipment. Strategic Management 
Journal, 25(1), 69-84.  
Sinha, R. K., & Noble, C. H. (2008). The adoption of radical manufacturing 
technologies and firm survival. Strategic Management Journal, 29(9), 
943-962.  
Son, D. (2013). Firm performance and technological competition (Master's 
dissertation), Seoul National Univ., Seoul. (In Korean) 
199 
 
Sosa, M. L. (2009). Application-specific R&D capabilities and the advantage 
of incumbents: Evidence from the anticancer drug market. Management 
Science, 55(8), 1409-1422.  
Stavins, J. (1995). Model entry and exit in a differentiated-product industry: 
The personal computer market. The review of Economics and Statistics, 
77(4), 571-584.  
Suarez, F. F., & Utterback, J. M. (1995). Dominant designs and the survival of 
firms. Strategic Management Journal, 16(6), 415-430.  
Sutton, J. (1997). Gibrat's legacy. Journal of Economic Literature, 35(1), 40-
59.  
Swaminathan, A. (1998). Entry into new market segments in mature 
industries: Endogenous and exogenous segmentation in the US brewing 
industry. Strategic Management Journal, 19(4), 389-404 
Theoharidou, M., Mylonas, A., & Gritzalis, D. (2012). A risk assessment 




Tushman, M. L., & Anderson, P. (1986). Technological discontinuities and 
organizational environments. Administrative Science Quarterly, 31(3), 
439-465.  
Utterback, J. M., & Abernathy, W. J. (1975). A dynamic model of process and 
product innovation. Omega, 3(6), 639-656.  
Utterback, J. M., & Suarez, F. F. (1993). Innovation, competition, and industry 
structure. Research Policy, 22(1), 1-21.  
Van Valen, L. (1973). A new evolutionary law. Evolutionary Theory, 1, 1-30.  
Wagner, J. (1994). The post-entry performance of new small firms in German 
manufacturing industries. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 42(2), 
141-154.  
Wagner, S., & Cockburn, I. (2010). Patents and the survival of Internet-related 
IPOs. Research Policy, 39(2), 214-228.  
Wenting, R. (2008). Spinoff dynamics and the spatial formation of the fashion 




Williams, G. C. (2008). Adaptation and natural selection: a critique of some 
current evolutionary thought. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Williamson, O. E. (1975). Markets and hierarchies: antitrust analysis and 
implications. New York: The Free Press.  
Windrum, P., & Birchenhall, C. (1998). Is product life cycle theory a special 
case? Dominant designs and the emergence of market niches through 
coevolutionary-learning. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, 
9(1), 109-134.  
Winter, S. G. (1984). Schumpeterian competition in alternative technological 
regimes. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 5(3), 287-320.  
Yoon, J (2014). The effects of firms' routine on evolution of product: focusing 
on mobile phone industry (Master's dissertation), Seoul National Univ., 











Table Appendix 31. The comparison of firm survival analysis by different 




~  1911 
Pre- 
Shakeout 




 (+2 years) 
~ 1913 
Firm Size Dummy -40.081*** -35.065*** -35.032*** 
 (0.446) (0.445) (0.444) 
First Mover Dummy -0.894*** -0.891*** -0.868*** 
 (0.208) (0.209) (0.200) 
Technology Level 0.295 0.198 0.072 
 (0.795) (0.841) (0.829) 
Technology Growth -0.016* -0.017** -0.016* 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) 
Product Dispersion -0.076 -0.078 -0.090 
 (0.072) (0.074) (0.071) 
Product Difference 0.111* 0.099* 0.087 
 (0.059) (0.060) (0.062) 
Log Likelihood -393.3 -393.8 -419.0 
Observation 233 174 322 
Notes: The values in parentheses are standard errors; *, ** and *** indicate statistical 






Table Appendix 32. The comparison of firm survival analysis by different 




1911 ~ 1927 
Shakeout 
(-2 years) 
1913 ~ 1925 
Shakeout 
(+2 years) 
1909 ~ 1929 
Firm Size Dummy -36.327*** -37.282*** -40.309*** 
 (0.411) (0.416) (0.414) 
First Mover Dummy -0.828*** -0.818*** -0.825*** 
 (0.264) (0.265) (0.262) 
Technology Level 0.204 0.074 0.285 
 (0.833) (0.833) (0.737) 
Technology Growth 0.008 0.007 0.007 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) 
Product Dispersion 0.043 0.035 0.054 
 (0.061) (0.061) (0.053) 
Product Difference -1.098** -0.959** -1.175** 
 (0.503) (0.436) (0.554) 
Log Likelihood -232.3 -200.9 -201.2 
Observation 1458 1024 1534 
Notes: The values in parentheses are standard errors; *, ** and *** indicate statistical 





Table Appendix 33. The comparison of firm survival analysis by different 












 (+2 years) 
1929 ~ 
Firm Size Dummy -35.765*** -43.778*** -44.798*** 
 (0.491) (0.517) (0.543) 
First Mover Dummy -0.936* -0.935* -1.329** 
 (0.539) (0.538) (0.652) 
Technology Level 1.389 1.813 1.384 
 (1.240) (1.474) (1.438) 
Technology Growth -0.017 -0.021 -0.016 
 (0.021) (0.023) (0.024) 
Product Dispersion -0.102 -0.118 -0.228 
 (0.114) (0.147) (0.352) 
Product Difference 0.801** 0.762** 0.860* 
 (0.383) (0.381) (0.476) 
Log Likelihood -83.48 -79.47 -50.60 
Observation 418 476 325 
Notes: The values in parentheses are standard errors; *, ** and *** indicate statistical 







Table Appendix 34. The comparison of firm survival analysis by different 












 (+2 years) 
~ 2005 
De novo Dummy -1.012 -1.007 -1.034 
 (0.710) (0.708) (1.141) 
Firm Size Dummy -34.860*** -36.857*** -45.619 
 (2.347) (2.342) (0.000) 
First Mover Dummy 0.960 0.962 1.336 
 (0.860) (0.860) (1.358) 
Technology Level -5.389** -5.430** -1.821* 
 (2.682) (2.704) (0.991) 
Technology Growth -0.015* -0.015* -0.018** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
Product Dispersion 0.118 0.118 0.054 
 (0.221) (0.221) (0.206) 
Product Difference 0.946 0.946 -0.079 
 (1.257) (1.254) (0.575) 
Log Likelihood -7.319 -7.322 -9.504 
Observations 117 94 143 
Notes: The values in parentheses are standard errors; *, ** and *** indicate statistical 





Table Appendix 35. The comparison of firm survival analysis by different 











De novo Dummy 0.161 -0.706 0.161 
 (0.808) (0.832) (0.808) 
Firm Size Dummy 0.295 1.649 0.295 
 (0.933) (1.146) (0.933) 
First Mover Dummy 2.050*** 1.054* 2.050*** 
 (0.735) (0.622) (0.735) 
Technology Level -7.535** -12.347*** -7.535** 
 (3.771) (4.578) (3.771) 
Technology Growth -0.037 0.042 -0.037 
 (0.055) (0.035) (0.055) 
Product Dispersion -1.100** -2.471*** -1.100** 
 (0.467) (0.690) (0.467) 
Product Difference -2.702* -2.175*** -2.702* 
 (1.419) (0.773) (1.419) 
Log Likelihood -18.05 -17.18 -18.05 
Observations 242 287 214 
Notes: The values in parentheses are standard errors; *, ** and *** indicate statistical 







산업이 생성된 이후에 많은 기업의 진입이 일어나지만, 이후 기업의 
수가 급감하는 Shakeout 현상을 경험한다. 산업 생애 주기 이론에 
따르면, 산업은 Shakeout 시기를 전후로 산업 전반에서 급격한 변화가 
일어난다. 특히 산업구조의 변화의 경우, 심한 경우 완전 경쟁 
시장에서 독과점에 이르기도 한다. 따라서 산업구조의 변화의 원인을 
밝힐 수 있다는 점에서 Shakeout 은 연구할 가치가 있다.  
한편 기업 측면에서, Shakeout 시기는 대규모 퇴출이 일어나기 때문에, 
이 시기의 생존 전략은 매우 중요하다. 게다가 Shakeout 시기에 생존한 
대부분의 기업들은 Shakeout 시기 이후의 산업 안정기 동안 장기간 
시장에 머무르며, 주도적 지위를 유지할 수 있기 때문에 그 의의는 더 
크다고 할 수 있다.  
이러한 중요성으로 인하여, Shakeout 시기에서의 생존의 법칙을 
밝히려는 연구는 많이 이루어졌다. 하지만 기업의 규모, 진입 시기, 
진입 전 경험에 관한 연구가 주를 이루며, 이러한 생존 요인은 기업이 
변경하기 어려운 요소들로 기업에게 많은 시사점을 제공하지 못하고 
있다. 즉, 선행 연구에서 기업은 시장 환경에 의해 선택되는 수동적인 
존재와 다름 없었다. 하지만, 진화 경제학의 선택과 적응의 개념에 
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따르면, 기업은 환경에 의해 선택되기도 하지만, 적응 노력을 통해 
시장 환경에 적응할 수 있는 능동적 존재로 인식해야 한다. 따라서 본 
논문에서는 기업의 적응 전략과 시장의 선택 메커니즘을 동시에 
고려하여 기존 연구들에서 도출하지 못했던 시사점을 제시하는 것을 
목적으로 한다. 그리고 Shakeout 시기와 Shakeout 전후는 산업의 
특성에서 많은 이질성을 보인다. 따라서 선택의 메커니즘이 변할 수 
있으며, 이 경우 적응 전략은 달라질 것이다. 따라서, 산업 진화의 
단계를 구분하여, 적응 전략과 선택 메커니즘을 도출하고자 한다. 이를 
위해 20 세기의 자동차 산업과 21 세기 모바일 산업을 통한 실증 분석을 
실시하였다. 두 산업의 특성과 발생 시기는 매우 상이하며, 시기와 
산업 특성에 따른 적응 전략과 선택 메커니즘의 차이 속에서 공통적인 
원리에 가까운 결과를 도출하기 위해 의도적으로 선택하였다.  
한편, 객관적인 적응 전략 변수의 도출에는 많은 장애 요인이 있기 
때문에, 실증 분석이 거의 이루어지지 못한 것으로 보인다. 본 
연구에서는 제품 수준의 데이터를 사용하여 이러한 장애 요인의 
극복을 시도하였다.  
사용된 데이터는 1905 년부터 1942 년까지의 총 21337 개의 미국의 
자동차 데이터와 1994 년부터 2012 년까지의 총 5508 개의 모바일 제품 
데이터이다. 이 제품 데이터로부터 도출된 적응 전략 변수는 기업의 
기술 수준, 기업의 기술 증가율, 제품 다각화, 제품 차별화이다.  
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적응 전략 변수와 함께 선행 연구로부터 도출된 기업의 규모, 
기업의 진입 시기, 기업의 산업 진입 전 경험 여부와 같은 주요 선택 
요인을 분석에 포함시키고, 산업의 진화 단계에 따라 기업의 적응 
전략과 선택 메커니즘이 어떻게 달라지는지를 시간 변수를 포함하는 
콕스 비례 위험 모형을 사용하여 분석하였다.   
위와 같은 방법으로 실시된 두 가지 실증의 주요 결과는 다음과 
같다. 두 산업의 실증 분석 결과 도출된 공통된 적응 전략은 첫째, 
Shakeout 이전에는 기술 증가율이 생존에 긍정적이라는 점이다. Shakeout 
이전 시기는 다른 기업에게 뒤쳐지지 않기 위해 레이스를 펼치는 
과정이라 할 수 있다. 이 시기는 기업의 수가 증가함에 따라 기술의 
증가 속도가 매우 빠른 시기이다. 따라서 이러한 빠른 증가 속도를 
따라가지 못한 기업이 퇴출된다. 
둘째, Shakeout 시기에는 제품 차별화를 시도해야 생존 확률을 높일 
수 있다는 점이다. 그리고 Shakeout 시기는 대부분의 기업이 퇴출된다. 
따라서 이 시기에 살아남기 위해서는 선행 연구들이 제시하는 바와 
같이 Dominant Design 을 만들어 규모의 경제를 이루고, 이를 통해 가격 
경쟁에서 살아남는 적응 전략을 사용하거나, 제품 차별화를 통해 생존 
가능성을 높여야 함을 의미한다. 따라서 대부분이 퇴출되는 
Shakeout 시기에서 오히려 다른 기업과 다르게 제품 차별화를 시도하는 
전략은 지금까지 알려 지지 않은 새로운 적응 전략이라 할 수 있다.  
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본 논문은 여러 부분에서 선행 연구와의 차별성과 의의는 다음과 
같다. 우선 진화 경제학의 선택과 적응 개념에서 두 개념을 동시에 
고려하였으며, 이를 통해 기업을 환경에 의해 선택되는 수동적 존재가 
아닌 적응을 통해 생존하는 능동적 존재로 인식할 수 있었다. 이러한 
시도를 통해 Shakeout 시기에 있어서 실천 가능한 시사점을 제공할 수 
있다는 점에서 의의가 있다. 
그리고 제품 수준의 데이터를 사용하여 적응 전략을 도출하여 
기업의 이질성을 고려할 수 있었다. 그리고 경영학이나 제품 동학에서 
주로 다루어 오던 제품 분석을 통해 산업의 진화와 연결시키고 있다는 
점에서 의의가 있다. 왜냐하면 제품 수준의 데이터는 주로 경영학이나 
공학에서 주로 다루어 왔기 때문이다. 따라서 본 연구는 경영학과 
경제학을 연결하는 학제간 연구로서의 의의를 가진다.  
마지막으로, 기업의 적응 노력을 포함하여 산업의 진화 과정을 
모형화하려는 시도는 여러 차례 있었지만, 이를 실증한 경우는 거의 
없었다. Gort and Klepper (1982) 역시 모형을 제시하였지만, 결국 우회적인 
방법으로 실증하였으며, 적응 전략을 포함시킨 직접적 실증에는 
실패하였다. 즉, 진화 경제학의 틀에서 적응 노력을 적극적으로 고려한 
매우 드문 연구로써 가치가 있으며, 제품 데이터를 통한 적응 전략 
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